Saint Louis University School of Law

Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship
2012

Undo Undue Hardship: An Objective Approach to Discharging
Federal Students Loans in Bankruptcy
Aaron N. Taylor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Education Law Commons, and the Inequality and Stratification
Commons

No. 2012 – 14
Undo Undue Hardship: An Objective Approach to Discharging Federal Students
Loans in Bankruptcy
Aaron N. Taylor
Working Paper

UNDO UNDUE HARDSHIP:
AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO DISCHARGING
FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS IN BANKRUPTCY
Aaron N. Taylor
A debtor seeking to discharge student loans in bankruptcy must
prove that paying the debt would cause an undue hardship upon him and
his dependents. Undue hardship, however, is an undefined concept,
flummoxing debtors, creditors, and judges alike. The result of this
ambiguity is rampant inconsistency in the manners in which similarlysituated debtors (and creditors) are treated by the courts. This Article
argues that the undue hardship standard should be replaced by a
framework that uses debt service thresholds to determine the propriety of
federal student loan bankruptcy discharges. Eligibility for discharge would
depend on outstanding loan amounts, debtor income history, federal
poverty guidelines, and the type of academic program in which the loan was
incurred. The goals of the framework would be two-fold: 1) to provide an
impartial, economical, and uniform means of assessing the propriety of
federal student loan discharges, and 2) to provide debtors facing crushing
student loan debt and few prospects for repaying it with a simplified avenue
of relief in bankruptcy.
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INTRODUCTION
What does undue hardship mean?
Poverty or something less extreme?
The standard Congress left undefined
Prompting both debtors and creditors to whine
Judges have been given the difficult task
Of making sense of the mess at hand
Selecting which test should be imposed
Brunner? Johnson? Totality? Who knows?!
Should debtor good faith play a part?
What about debtor’s right to a fresh start?
And in cases where hardship is undue,
Does full, partial, or hybrid discharge ensue?
Just some of the questions that come to mind,
Due to the standard left undefined
So with clarity and fairness overrun
Undue hardship should be undone.1
When Congress first imposed the undue hardship standard upon debtors
seeking to discharge student loans in bankruptcy, it intended the standard to
be the final barrier against debtor abuse.2 Congress reasoned that the very
viability of the federal student loan program required that only honest
debtors receive relief.3 Through the years, however, Congress fashioned the
1

This fit of artistic indulgence was inspired by a bankruptcy judge’s poetic means of
lamenting the “unusual and confusing language” contained in the automatic dismissal
provision of 11 U.S.C. § 521. In re Riddle, 344 B.R. 702, 703 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).
2
156 CONG. REC. E570 (2010) (statements of Rep. Steve Cohen) [hereinafter Cohen
Remarks] (“Congress’s intent in enacting [the undue hardship] provision back in 1978 was
to protect Federal student loan programs from fraud and abuse by student borrowers and
ultimately to protect the taxpayer dollars that fund Federal student loan programs.”).
3
Id.; see also, e.g., Claxton v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n (In re Claxton), 140 B.R. 565,
570 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992) (reasoning that when debtors repay student loans, “they are
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undue hardship barrier into a bulwark, representing the sole means of
getting student loans discharged in bankruptcy.4 But while repeatedly
increasing the standard’s prominence, Congress failed to increase its clarity.
Undue hardship is an undefined concept, flummoxing debtors, creditors,
and judges alike.5 The result of its ambiguous contours is rampant
inconsistency. Judges define the standard differently,6 they impose
different conceptual tests on debtors,7 and when undue hardship is found,
relief is often dependent upon judicial philosophy rather than the merits of
the case.8 In the end, similarly-situated debtors (and creditors) are treated
differently based on the courts in which they find themselves, leaving an
irony where inconsistency is the most consistent aspect of the standard’s
application.
Inconsistency is not the only shortcoming of the undue hardship
standard.
The premise underlying the standard’s purpose is also
illegitimate. In the 1970s, the media began to tap into concern about the
“rising tide of bankruptcies”,9 and sensational stories about doctors and
lawyers receiving student loan discharges “on the eve of embarking on
lucrative careers” began to damage public perceptions of the loan
program.10 In response, Congress restricted the circumstances in which
helping to make education available for others,” and therefore Congress intended for
student loan debtors’ right to relief to “yield to some extent”).
4
See generally B.J. Huey, Comment, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time
Finally Arrived for Congress to Discharge Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34
TEX. TECH L. REV. 89 (2002) (providing a history of student loan discharge provisions).
5
In re Claxton, 140 B.R. at 568 (“[T]he Bankruptcy Code does not define ‘undue
hardship;’ and it is not clear exactly what it is that debtors must prove.”).
6
Compare Skaggs v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Skaggs), 196 B.R. 865, 867
(Bankr. W.D. Okla 1996) (reasoning that “undue hardship” should be defined using “the
plain, ordinary meaning of those words”), with Heckathorn v. United States ex rel. U.S.
Dep't of Educ. (In re Heckathorn), 199 B.R. 188, 194-95 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996)
(“Although the words ‘undue’ and ‘hardship’ are common English words, their
combination in this statute obviously constitutes a term of art, i.e., a phrase with a
particular legal meaning and function, which is based on but may be more specialized than
common usage.”).
7
Kopf v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (discussing
the predominant tests courts use to determine undue hardship).
8
See, e.g., Grigas v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Grigas), 252 B.R. 866, 870-74
(Bankr. D. N.H. 2000) (providing overview of three judicial approaches to student loan
discharge: full, partial, and hybrid).
9
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 2 (1973) (“The most dramatic fact about bankruptcy
administered under the present Act is the rising tide of bankruptcies since World War II.”).
10
Frank T. Bayuk, Comment, The Superiority of Partial Discharge for Student Loans
Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(8): Ensuring a Meaningful Existence for the Undue Hardship
Exception, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2004).
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student loans could be discharged, making loans non-dischargeable within
the first five years of repayment,11 but still dischargeable thereafter.
Accompanying this new restriction was an exception that allowed for loans
in repayment for less than five years to be discharged in cases where a
debtor could prove that paying the loans would cause an undue hardship
upon him and his dependents.12 In the years to follow, Congress would
lengthen and eventually remove the period of mandatory repayment,
making the undue hardship exception the only path to student loan
discharge.13 This gradual tightening was premised on preventing abuse of
the bankruptcy system and the student loan program by crafty debtors.14
However, the anecdotal evidence on which Congress relied has not held up
to empirical scrutiny.15
The undue hardship standard has another deleterious effect: it makes it
difficult for debtors to discharge debt incurred as a result of lack of
information or misinformation about educational offerings. Most students
choose a college based on very limited information. Information regarding
school quality is sparse and, where it exists, often inscrutable.16
Additionally, information regarding the financial implications of attending
college often comes too late, if at all.17 The resulting “information
11

NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 207 (1997),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/reportcont.html (follow links to relevant sections)
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT1997].
12
Id. at 209.
13
See generally Huey, supra note 4 (providing a history of student loan discharge
provisions).
14
See, e.g., Cohen Remarks, supra note 2, at E570.
15
See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 53-54 (“Notwithstanding the notoriety of
‘scam’ bankruptcies, absconding and concealing debtors, and other instances of egregious
conduct in, and in anticipation of, cases under the Act, the Commission has found little
empirical substantiation that dishonest conduct is a cause of bankruptcy in a significant
number of cases.”); cf. COMMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 82 (“But the statistical
evidence suggests that consumers who file for bankruptcy today, as a group, are
experiencing a financial crisis similar to the crisis faced by families when filing rates were
only a fraction of their present levels.”).
16
BRIDGET TERRY LONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GRADING HIGHER EDUCATION: GIVING
CONSUMERS THE INFORMATION THEY NEED 1 (2010), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/12/pdf/longpaper.pdf (“[T]he process of
college choice involves simultaneously ranking options in multiple ways, relying on
incomplete and uncertain information, and receiving little or no support for interpreting the
facts that are available.”).
17
PAMELA BURDMAN, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, THE STUDENT DEBT
DILEMMA: DEBT AVERSION AS A BARRIER TO COLLEGE ACCESS 9 (2005), available at
http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/DebtDilemma.pdf (“There is no clear or
established division of labor between high school officials, admissions and outreach offices
and financial aid offices that ensures students receive the information they need when they
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asymmetry”18 creates an environment where students are more susceptible
to bad educational matches19 or to being victimized by misrepresentations
or other improprieties.20 When a student attends a school based on lack of
information or, worse yet, false information, her chances of completing the
program are diminished.21 And unfortunately, students who leave college
without earning a credential are often saddled with student loan debt that
they will likely have difficulty repaying.22
Few courts consider the value of the education received when making
undue hardship determinations.23 The reasoning behind this approach is
that the federal government is not “an insurer of educational value.”24 It has
also been argued that a student loan is an individual investment, and
therefore, the taxpayers should not be held responsible if the investment
fails to pay off.25 However, victims of higher education misrepresentations
are offered few avenues for redress by the courts or by regulatory
agencies.26 Courts are reluctant to recognize certain types of claims against
educational institutions.27 Regulatory agencies are more concerned with
need it.”).
18
The term “information asymmetry” denotes the difference in access to information
between education providers and education consumers. David D. Dill, Allowing the
Market to Rule: The Case of the United States, 57 HIGHER EDUC. Q. 136, 147 (2003).
19
LONG, supra note 16, at 9 (“Without easily obtainable information and a clear map of the
key factors worth considering and how to process them, there are many examples of
decisions that probably represent ‘bad matches.’”).
20
Dill, supra note 18, at 147 (“[B]ecause higher education in the US is an industry in
which consumers cannot objectively evaluate the quality of the service before they
purchase it, an information asymmetry can exist in which institutions may take advantage
of consumers.”).
21
Brian A. Jacob & Tamara Wilder, Educational Expectations and Attainment 18 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15683, 2010) (“The fact that most students
attain less education than they expect . . . suggests that misinformation is the cause of the
gap.”).
22
See LONG, supra note 16, at 9 (“[A]lmost half of college students who attend a four-year
institution fail to get a degree. Meanwhile, these students carry significant amounts of
student debt that is not likely to be justified without receipt of a college credential.”).
23
The Brunner test is the dominant undue hardship test. The court in Brunner argued that
“[c]onsideration of [educational value] . . . is antithetical to the spirit of the guaranteed loan
program.” Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R.
752, 755 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
24
Id.
25
Id. at 755-56 n.3
26
See Aaron N. Taylor, “Your Results May Vary”: Protecting Students and Taxpayers
Through Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV.
729 (2010).
27
Id. at 763 (explaining how the judicial concept of academic abstention disadvantages
plaintiffs in lawsuits against educational institutions).
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protecting public interests than those of individuals.28 Thus, in order to
provide some level of protection to students who receive little monetary
benefit from their educational experiences, whether because of impropriety
or simple misfortune, bankruptcy discharge should be a viable avenue of
relief from the burdens of student loan debt.
This Article argues that the undue hardship standard should be undone,
replaced by a bright-line rule that uses debt service thresholds to determine
the propriety of federal student loan bankruptcy discharges.29 Educational
value plays a central role in the proposed framework, as eligibility for
discharge would depend on outstanding loan amounts, debtor income
history, federal poverty guidelines, and the type of academic program in
which the loan was incurred. The goals of the framework would be twofold: 1) to provide an impartial, economical, and uniform means of
assessing the propriety of student loan discharges, and 2) to provide debtors
facing crushing student loan debt and few prospects for repaying it with a
simplified avenue of relief in bankruptcy.
The Article begins, in Part I, with a discussion of the factors that have
made post-secondary education virtually obligatory, including how salary
and labor market trends engender an investment mindset among students.
Part II describes the speculative nature of educational investments. Part III
documents the trend towards increased education borrowing. Part IV
discusses the dismal educational outcomes that contribute to student loan
over-indebtedness.
Part V explains how lack of information and
misinformation influence students’ educational decisions.
Part VI
highlights inconsistency and ambiguity in bankruptcy law, particularly in
the area of student loan discharge. And finally, Part VII presents the
framework for using debt service thresholds to determine the propriety of
student loan bankruptcy discharges.
I: EDUCATION AS AN INVESTMENT
We have all heard the axiom: Education pays. This simple
declaration serves as a compelling justification for undertaking—and in the
process, investing in—higher education.
It is frequently the title
30
31
encapsulation of studies, reports, and news articles32 extolling the virtues
28

Id. at 731.
Currently, the undue hardship standard is applied to private student loans in the same
manner it is applied to federal loans in bankruptcy. However, the framework proposed in
this article would only apply to federal student loans for reasons discussed in VII.A.6.
30
E.g., SANDY BAUM, ET AL., COLL. BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY CTR.,EDUCATION PAYS
2010: THE BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY (2010),
29
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of education. If higher education was a company, “Education Pays” would
be its “Just do it.” A review of relevant data shows that education does
indeed pay—on a wide range of quality-of-life indicators. Higher levels of
education are associated with various job-related benefits, including higher
salaries,33 better fringe benefits,34 and more job satisfaction.35 Education
has also been tied to better health,36 increased parental effectiveness,37 and
greater civic behavior.38
A. Salary Differences
The decision to undertake higher education has been termed the
“Million Dollar Question”.39 This characterization references the oft-cited
difference in lifetime earnings between a college graduate and a high school
graduate.40 Research has concluded that over the span of a 40-year career,
college graduates will earn about sixty-six percent more in salary than high
school graduates.41 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the
median weekly pay for bachelor’s degree-holders is $1,053, while the
median for high school graduates is $638.42 These degree-based salary
differences get larger as the comparisons get starker. For example, the
median salary for professional degree-holders is almost four times the
median for individuals with less than a high school diploma.43 Also, the
available at http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/Education_Pays_2010.pdf.
31
See, e.g., Employment Projections: Education Pays, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (last modified
March 23, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm.
32
See, e.g., Jack Z. Smith, A Simple Lesson: Education Pays, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, March
17, 2009, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2009/mar/17/a-simple-lesson-educationpays/.
33
See BAUM, ET AL., supra note 30, at 10.
34
See id.
35
Philip Oreopoulos & Kjell G. Salvanes, How Large are Returns to Schooling? Hint:
Money Isn’t Everything 8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Resarch, Working Paper No. 15339,
2009).
36
Id. at 10.
37
Id. at 12.
38
See BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 10.
39
Harvard researcher Bridget Terry Long coined this term as part of her research into
college graduation rates. Answering the Million-Dollar Question: The Problem of College
Attrition—Could Institutions Do More?, HGSE NEWS, Apr. 16, 2003,
http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/features/long04152003.html.
40
Id.
41
BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 12.
42
BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 31.
43
Median weekly pay for professional degree-holders is $1,665 compared to $451 for less
than a high school diploma. Id.
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wage premiums associated with schooling increase as time in school
increases. The first year of college is associated with an 11% median
increase in earnings; the fourth year of college is associated with a 16%
increase; and the second year of graduate or professional school is
associated with a 19% increase.44
The data suggests that the salary benefits of education appear early
in an individual’s career. Among workers aged 25-34, bachelor’s degreeholders make 50% more than high school graduates.45 As such, an
individual is able to account for income lost while in school relatively early
in her career. At median salary levels, it has been estimated that it takes
bachelor’s degree holders about eleven years to recoup expenses related to
earning the degree, including actual expenses and lost salary. 46 This means
that the typical bachelor’s degree-holder “breaks even” on her education
investment barely a quarter of the way into her 40-year career.
The earnings premium on education has grown over the last thirty
years. During the period from 1980 to 2005, the earnings premium of a
college degree (compared to a high school diploma) increased 22%.47
Another study found that the earnings premium between college and high
school educated workers increased 30% between 1963 and 2009, albeit
fitfully.48 Even after accounting for race and years of work experience,
researchers conclude that earnings premium trends hold.49

44

BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 17.
SUSAN AUD, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., THE CONDITION
OF EDUCATION 2011, at 56 (2011), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011033.pdf (“[Y]oung
adults with a bachelor’s degree earned more than twice as much as those without a high
school diploma or its equivalent in 2009 . . . , 50 percent more than young adult high school
completers, and 25 percent more than young adults with an associate’s degree.”).
46
BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 7 (comparing the earnings of high school graduates to
those of college graduates and concluding that at about the age of 33 “higher earnings
compensate . . . for four years out of the labor force [and the] average tuition and fee
payments at a public four-year university funded fully by student loans at 6.8% interest.”);
cf. id. (“The earnings of associate degree recipients lead to a crossover at about the same
age—after more years of work despite the lower tuition payments—because of the smaller
earnings premium.”).
47
Jacob & Wilder, supra note 21, at 1.
48
DAVID AUTOR, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE POLARIZATION OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES IN
THE U.S. LABOR MARKET: IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 5 (2010),
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/pdf/job_polarization.pdf (“In
1963, the hourly wage of the typical college graduate was approximately 1.5 times the
hourly wage of the typical high school graduate. By 2009, this ratio stood at 1.95. The
entirety of this 45 percentage point rise occurred after 1980. In fact, the college-to-highschool earnings ratio declined by 10 percentage points in the 1970s.”).
49
See, e.g., BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 17.
45
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The increased education premium is the result of both an increase in
the inflation-adjusted earnings of college degree holders and a decrease in
the earnings of high school educated workers.50 In fact, the decline in
wages for those with just a high school diploma is described as a “major
proximate cause” of the increased premium.51 But the larger cause of the
trend is simple supply and demand. The last thirty years or so have seen a
decrease in the relative supply of college-educated workers.52 As the
economy has demanded more highly skilled, or college-educated, workers
and the relative number of such individuals entering the workforce has
declined,53 employers have been willing to pay more for those workers.54
B. Economic Trends
The modern economy is heavily tilted in favor of college-educated
workers. Technological advancements and foreign outsourcing have led to
a polarization or “hollowing out” of job opportunities in the U.S.55 The
salient characteristics of this trend are an accumulation of job growth at the
extremes of the spectrum and a diminishment of “middle-wage, middleskill” jobs.56 For example, job growth in high-skill fields57 has been strong
during the last few decades; even during the “Great Recession,”58
50

See AUTOR, supra note 48, at 26.
Id. (“[M]ajor proximate cause of the growing college/high school earnings gap is not
steeply rising college wages but rapidly declining wages for the less educated—especially
less-educated males.”).
52
See id. at 1 (“[S]ince the late 1970s and early 1980s, the rise in U.S. education levels has
not kept up with the rising demand for skilled workers, and the slowdown in educational
attainment has been particularly severe for males. The result has been a sharp rise in the
inequality of wages.”).
53
Id. at 25 (“[T]he skill demands of the U.S. economy did not stand still over the course of
these decades even as college completion rates slowed. Consequently, college graduates
are increasingly scarce relative to the set of jobs seeking them.”).
54
Id. at 6 (“One important proximate cause for the rising relative earnings of college
graduates is the slowdown in the rate of entry of new college graduates into the U.S. labor
market starting in the early 1980s.”).
55
Id. at 2.
56
Id. at 1; see also id. at 1610. (describing middle-wage, middle-skill jobs as “Sales,
office/admin, production, and operators”).
57
Examples of high-skill jobs are “[m]anagerial, professional, and technical occupations.”
See id. at 10.
58
The term “Great Recession” is a popular reference to the recession that began in
December 2007 and ended in June 2009. See, e.g., Neil Irwin, It's Official: The Great
Recession Ended Last Summer, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2010,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/politicalconomy/2010/09/its_official_the_great_recessi.html.
51
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opportunities in this sector remained stable.59 Similarly, the low-skilled job
sector60 survived the recession with no net job losses.61 On the other hand,
middle-skill white-collar jobs declined by 8% and middle-skill blue-collar
jobs fell by 16% between 2007 and 2009.62 Based on projections, job
growth will be strongest in the high-skill, professional sector, followed by
the low-skill, service sector.63 These trends demonstrate that the bulk of the
well-paying job growth will be in fields that require highly educated
workers who can think, adapt, and thrive in work environments increasingly
dominated by technology.64 Middle-skill jobs that historically have
required less than a bachelor’s degree will be increasingly replaced by
machines or outsourced to lower-cost workers in other countries.65
The trend away from less-educated workers has already begun in
earnest. In 1973, workers with less than a college degree made up about
72% of the workforce; by 2007, that proportion had fallen to just 41%.66
The actual numbers associated with these trends highlight the shift in even
starker terms. Between 1970 and 2007, the number of workers in the U.S.
increased by 63 million to a total of 154 million.67 However, even with this
70% increase, the total number of jobs for workers with less than a college
degree fell by two million.68 Put differently, college educated workers
netted 65 million new jobs over this 27-year period, which accounted for
59

AUTOR, supra note 48, at 8 (“Employment growth in these high-skill occupations was
robust throughout the past three decades. Even in the current recession, these occupations
experienced almost no decline in employment.”).
60
Examples of low-skill jobs are “[“p]rotective service, food prep, janitorial/cleaning,
personal care/services”. See id. at 16.
61
Id. at 4.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 12 (“The BLS forecasts that employment in service occupations will increase by
4.1 million, or 14 percent, between 2008 and 2018. The only major occupational category
with greater projected growth is professional occupations, which are predicted to add 5.2
million jobs, or 17 percent.”).
64
Id. at 23 (“The secularly rising demand for literate, numerate, and analytically capable
workers stems from the changing job requirements of a rapidly technologically advancing
economy.”).
65
Id. at 2 (“The key contributors to job polarization are the automation of routine work
and, to a smaller extent, the international integration of labor markets through trade and,
more recently, offshoring.”).
66
HARVARD GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC., PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY PROJECT: MEETING
THE CHALLENGE OF PREPARING YOUNG AMERICANS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2011)
[hereinafter PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY],
http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news_events/features/2011/Pathways_to_Prosperity_Feb2011.
67
Id.
68
Id.; see also id. (“[O]ver the past third of a century, all of the net job growth in American
has been generated by positions that require at least some post-secondary education.”).
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42% of all the jobs in 2007.69 Add to that number the almost 26 million
jobs that were already filled by college educated workers, and the extent of
the tilt in their favor becomes more evident. Moreover, economists project
that of the 47 million jobs to be created between 2008 and 2018, collegeeducated workers will fill almost two-thirds of them.70 This trend will push
the overall percentage of workers with no college experience below 40%.71
C. Employment Trends
Unsurprisingly, given job market trends, college-educated workers
are more likely to be employed. In fact, education has been called “a pretty
good insurance policy for workers during the Great Recession.”72
According to 2012 BLS statistics, the unemployment rate fell as education
level increased.73 The rate for individuals with bachelor’s degrees was
4.9%, while the rate for individuals with high school diplomas was 9.4%.74
At opposite ends of the paradigm were individuals with doctoral degrees
and those with less than high school diplomas—the latter having an
unemployment rate almost six times higher than the former.75 Even when
assessing the employment-to-population ratio, a broader measure of
employment,76 it is clear that college-educated individuals fare much better
in the job market. In 2009, 82.5% of all college-educated individuals were
employed, compared to only 67.253% of high school educated
individuals.77 During the most recent recession, the employment-to69

Calculations by author. Id.
Id.
71
Calculations by author. Id.
72
ALAN BERUBE, BROOKINGS INST., DEGREEES OF SEPARATION: EDUCATION,
EMPLOYMENT, AND THE GREAT RECESSION IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1 (2010),
available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/1105_metro_america_berube/110
5_metro_america_education_berube.pdf.
73
The unemployment rates for individuals with associate’s degrees or higher were lower
than the 7.6% overall rate. Individuals with lower levels of education had rates higher than
the overall rate. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., supra note 31.
74
Id.
75
Id. (listing the unemployment rates for individuals with doctoral degrees and those with
less than a high school diploma as 2.5% and 14.1% respectively).
76
The employment-to-population ratio is calculated using the employment status of all
non-institutionalized individuals of working-age (16 and up). The unemployment rate is
calculated using the employment status of working-age individuals, but only if they are
employed or actively looking for employment. As such, the pool of individuals accounted
for in the employment-to-population ratio is larger. See generally BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, BLS INFORMATION, GLOSSARY, http://www.bls.gov/bls/glossary.htm.
77
BERUBE, supra note 72, at 3.
70
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population ratio for individuals without a bachelor’s degree fell at a rate
more than four times that of individuals with the degree.78
The benefits of education on employment transcend race and age.
Blacks, whites, and Hispanics all see greater odds of employment with
higher education.79 For blacks, the employment gap between bachelor’s
degree-holders and those with only a high school diploma was almost seven
percent; among whites and Hispanics, it was about 5%.80 Among
individuals aged 25-30, an associate’s degree serves as an educational line
of demarcation, with individuals at that level and above experiencing
significantly better job prospects than those below.81 Interestingly, the
benefits of education on employment do not just flow in the direction of the
educated. Among the twenty most educated metropolitan areas, sixteen
experienced below-average declines in employment,82 and these favorable
conditions seemed to protect less educated workers from some of the
unfavorable trends experienced by similar workers elsewhere.83 In other
words, high levels of educational attainment foster healthy job markets that
benefit even the less educated in those areas.
As part of a total compensation package, college educated workers
tend to receive better fringe benefits than their less educated peers. Access
to employer-sponsored pension plans tends to be tied to education level,84
as does employer-sponsored health care coverage.85 College educated
78

Id. (“The employment-to population ratio dropped by more than 2 percentage points
from 2007 to 2009 for working-age adults without a bachelor’s degree, but fell by only half
a percentage point for college-educated individuals.”).
79
BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 21.
80
Id.
81
PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY, supra note 66, at 5 (“Among all groups, young adults—aged
25 to 30—who have earned at least an associate’s degree, are significantly more likely to
be employed than those who have a high school degree or less.”).
82
BERUBE, supra note 72, at 1 (“Among the 20 metro areas with the highest rates of
bachelor’s degree attainment, only four registered declines in their overall employment-topopulation ratio from 2007 to 2009 that exceeded the national average.”).
83
Id. (“[E]mployment for workers without a high school diploma was also less impacted in
these highly educated metro areas than in other markets.”).
84
BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 23 (“[Seventy percent] of four-year college graduates
were offered pension plans by their employers in 2008. Employer-provided pension plans
were available to 65% of associate degree recipients, 61% of workers with some college
but not degree, 55% of high school graduates, and only 30% of those who did not complete
high school.”); see also id. (“Among those to whom these plans are available, participation
rates are higher for individuals with higher education levels.”).
85
Id. at 24 (“In 2008, 68% of four-year college graduates working at least half-time in the
private sector were covered by employer-provided health insurance. Only 50% of high
school graduates had this benefit.”); see also id. (“The gap between health care coverage
for high school graduates and four-year college graduates grew from 10 percentage points
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workers tend to be employed in more prestigious jobs86 and report having
higher job satisfaction.87 Better work lives seem to contribute to better
personal lives. Educated individuals are more likely to engage in leisure
time activities,88 including volunteer work and other civic activities.89 This
trend may be due to the better employment compensation and the greater
autonomy afforded college educated workers.90 Many researchers have
found a positive correlation between education and healthy lifestyle
choices.91 Educated workers are less likely to smoke92 or be obese.93
Additionally, education has been tied to better parenting practices and
outcomes. The children of educated parents tend to be healthier,94 and they
demonstrate higher cognitive ability95 than children of less educated
parents. The benefits of having educated parents persist throughout the life
of the child, with better employment outcomes as an adult being a common
manifestation.96 And if all those benefits were not enough, some
researchers have concluded that education actually makes an individual
more attractive.97

in 1979 to 14 percentage points in 1988, 17 percentage points in 1998, and 18 percentage
points in 2008.”).
86
Oreopoulos & Salvanes, supra note 35, at 8 (providing results of an occupational
prestige study).
87
BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 19 (“In 2008, about 58% of college graduates and
individuals with some college education or an associate degree reported being very
satisfied with their jobs, while 50% of high school graduates and 40% of individuals
without a high school diploma reported being very satisfied.”).
88
Id. at 28.
89
Id. at 32. (“Both the percentage of people who donate their time to organizations and the
number of hours people spend in volunteer activities are higher among individuals with
higher levels of education.”); see also id. at 33 (“In every age group, adults with higher
levels of education are more likely to vote than those with lower levels of education.”).
90
See generally Oreopoulos & Salvanes, supra note 35, at 6.
91
Id. at 10 (“Many studies find a strong positive correlation between schooling and
multiple measures of health outcomes, healthy habits, and healthy activities, with this
correlation remaining large after conditioning on income.”).
92
BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 27.
93
Id. at 29.
94
See, e.g., id. at 30.
95
Id. at 10.
96
Oreopoulos & Salvanes, supra note 35, at 12 (“For couples with children, parental
schooling strongly relates to children’s development and social-economic success
throughout life. Health, social integration, test scores, and labor market outcomes all
correlate positively with both mother and father’s attainment.”).
97
Id. at 11 (reasoning that “[m]en and women with more earnings potential or with more
prestigious jobs become more appealing in a competitive marriage market”).
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D. Societal Benefits
This discussion would be incomplete without a mention of the
societal benefits of education. Because educated individuals tend to make
more money, they also tend to pay more taxes. Typically, a college
educated worker will pay about 80% more in taxes than a high school
educated worker.98 Higher education is also tied to less reliance on public
assistance programs.99 In 2008, 8% of high school educated adults aged 25
and older lived in households receiving food stamps, compared to 1% of
adults with bachelor’s degrees.100
And because college educated
individuals commit less crime, society saves on incarceration costs.101
When the benefits of education are added up, the grand total is immense.
The societal savings from an individual completing a college degree, as
opposed to only earning a high school diploma, “range from $32,600 for
white women to $108,700 for black men.”102 So, does education pay?
Indeed, it does.

II. EDUCATION AS A RISKY INVESTMENT
The payoff from education has cultivated an investment mindset
among students.103 A recent study conducted by Gallup found that eightyfour percent of surveyed students strongly agreed with the statement:
College is an investment in my future.104 Seventy-four percent strongly
agreed that “having a college degree is more important now than it used to

98

BAUM, ET AL., supra note 30, at 10.
Id. (“Spending on social support programs such as unemployment compensation, food
stamps, and Medicaid is much lower for individuals with higher levels of education.”).
100
Oreopoulos & Salvanes, supra note 35, at 8.
101
BAUM, ET AL., supra note 30, at 4.
102
These figures were calculated by estimating the reductions in public expenditures
associated with social programs and incarceration. Id. at 22.
103
See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE CONG. OF THE U.S., A CBO PAPER: PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO FINANCING COLLEGE EDUCATION 4 (2004) [hereinafter CBO
PAPER], http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4984/01-23-Education.pdf.
104
The survey asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with a particular
statement using a five-point scale, where a ‘5’ indicated strong agreement and a ‘1’
indicated strong disagreement. SALLIE MAE & GALLUP, HOW AMERICA PAYS FOR
COLLEGE: SALLIE MAE’S NAT’L STUDY OF COLLEGE STUDENTS AND PARENTS 50 (2010)
[hereinafter GALLUP], https://www1.salliemae.com/NR/rdonlyres/D5D78A1C-BBB84D97-AE9B7EC35558AD5F/13390/SLMGallupReportHowAmericaPaysforCollege81010FINAL2.pdf.
99
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be.”105 And even with increased costs of attendance, more than half of
students strongly agreed both that college is worth the cost and that they
were willing to stretch themselves financially to attend the best college
possible.106 This desire to attend college and willingness to pay for it are
reflections of the investment mindset that has spurred widespread
participation in higher education. But, like all investments, educational
investments are risky; some would say very risky.107
A. Salary Trends
For starters, speculating on future trends is always a risky endeavor,
particularly when information is limited and options are numerous. The old
investment adage “past performance does not necessarily predict future
results” applies squarely to educational investments. While higher
education seems increasingly obligatory in the workforce, the relative
payoff seems to be leveling off, if not waning. Data compiled by the
College Board showed that between 1998 and 2008, median salary
increases for workers aged 25-34 with bachelor’s degrees barely exceeded
inflation.108 For younger workers with associate’s degrees or some college
experience, their salaries trailed inflation.109 So while workers with college
experience fared better than other workers,110 the college investment looks
surprisingly less favorable than the respondents to the Gallup survey would
probably assume.
Ironically, one of the most compelling illustrations of the risks
associated with investments in higher education is the most cited
justification for incurring those risks: salary differentials. As discussed
earlier, higher levels of education are associated with higher income. But
the “Education pays” mantra largely ignores the variable nature of
educational outcomes. Just because the median salary for bachelor’s degree
holders is higher than that of individuals with only high school diplomas
does not mean that every bachelor degree holder makes more money than

105

Id. at 51.
Id.; see also id. at 52 (indicating that more than 60% of respondents from the lowest
income households strongly agreed with these statements).
107
LONG, supra note 16, at 1 (citing high costs and low completion rates in describing “the
college investment” as a “high-risk proposition”).
108
BAUM, ET AL., supra note 30, at 16.
109
Id.
110
Id. (emphasizing that the decline in wages for younger workers with associate’s degrees
or some college experience were not as steep as the declines for workers with only high
school diplomas).
106
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every person with just a high school diploma.111 For example, about 20% of
male bachelor’s degree holders earn less than the median salary for high
school graduates.112
Among women, 16% of bachelor’s degree holders earned less than
the median high school graduate salary.113 Another study found that more
than a quarter of individuals possessing a post-secondary certificate or
license earned more than the median bachelor’s degree salary.114 These are
not trivial exceptions. According to Census data, 60 million adults aged 25
and over possess bachelor’s degrees.115 So these exceptions represent
millions of individuals whose education investments are not paying off to
the extent they likely expected.
A deeper review of the salary differential data reveals another
important factor that often goes ignored: the publicized premium on higher
education is often inflated. As mentioned earlier, one reason for the
increased education premium over the last three decades was an increase in
the inflation-adjusted earnings of college graduates.116
Cursory
consideration of this trend might lead one to conclude that recipients of all
college degrees enjoyed the same, or a similar, premium. However, most of
the increase was experienced by workers with college degrees beyond the
baccalaureate level.117 For example, between 1979 and 2007, the inflationadjusted earnings for men with bachelor’s degrees increased 10%; but the
wages for men with graduate or professional degrees increased a much
more robust 26%.118 For women, the inflation-adjusted earnings for
bachelor’s degree and graduate or professional degree holders increased
111

See, e.g., SANDY BAUM & SAUL SCHWARTZ, COLLEGE BOARD, HOW MUCH DEBT IS TOO
MUCH? DEFINING BENCHMARKS FOR MANAGEABLE STUDENT DEBT 7 (2006), available at
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/pdf/06-0869.DebtPpr060420.pdf.
112
BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 7; see also id. (stating that 14% of males with only a
high school diploma earned as much or more than the median salary for bachelor’s degree
holders).
113
BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 15-16 (stating that 13% of females with only a high
school diploma earned as much or more than the median salary for bachelor’s degree
holders).
114
PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY, supra note 66, at 3.
115
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MORE WORKING WOMEN THAN MEN HAVE COLLEGE DEGREES,
CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/education/cb11-72.html.
116
A decline in the earnings of workers with only a high school diploma was the other
reason. AUTOR, supra note 48, at 26.
117
Id. (“[A] sizable share of the increase in wages for college-educated workers relative to
noncollege-educated workers since 1980 is explained by rising wages for workers with
postbaccalaureate degrees.”).
118
Id.
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29% and 37% respectively.119 Combining these statistics, as is often done,
likely overstates the payoff from earning a bachelor’s degree—and as a
result understates the investment risks.
B. Economic Trends
There is also concern that economic trends may be threatening jobs
of college educated workers in a manner previously experienced by workers
in manufacturing fields that did not require much education beyond high
school. Nobel Laureate economist, Paul Krugman, states, “Many of the
high-wage occupations that grew rapidly in the 1990s have seen much
slower growth recently, even as growth in low-wage employment has
accelerated.”120 The occupations to which Krugman is referring are among
those that require higher education, and his conclusion acknowledges
research showing that jobs in high-skill fields have become increasingly
“tradable”, “offshoreable”, or susceptible to automation.121 One surprising
finding is that jobs requiring higher levels of education might actually be
more susceptible to offshoring than those requiring only low-levels.122
The prevailing view seems to be that it is the nature of a job, not the
skill-level or education required, that determines its chances of being lost to
foreign workers or to technology. If the service can be “delivered [to its
end user] electronically over long distances with little or no degradation in
quality”, it is offshoreable (or tradable).123 If the job is sufficiently “rulebased,” it can be automated.124 And these jobs are found across the skill
119

Id. at 27.
Paul Krugman, Degrees and Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, at A21, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/opinion/07krugman.html.
121
“Tradable” and “offshoreable” are largely synonymous concepts theorized by
economists seeking to describe the extent to which an industry and the jobs therein are at
risk of being lost to cheaper workforces in other countries. J. Bradford Jensen & Lori G.
Kletzer, Tradable Services: Understanding the Scope and Impact of Services Outsourcing,
1-22 (Inst. for Int’l Econ. Working Paper No. 05-9, 2005), available at
http://www.piie.com/publications/wp/wp05-9.pdf. See, also, Alan S. Blinder, How Many
U.S. Jobs Might Be Offshoreable?, 1-44 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Studies, Working Paper No.
142, 2007), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/workingpapers/142blinder.pdf.
122
Blinder, supra note 121, at 33 (finding a weak direct correlation between
“offshoreability” of occupations and the level of higher educational attainment they
require).
123
Id. at 2.
124
David H. Autor, Frank Levy & Richard Murnane, The Skill Content of Recent
Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration 1-45 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8337, 2000), available at
http://web.mit.edu/flevy/www/skillcontent.pdf.
120
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and education spectra.125 In fact, employers may have an enhanced
financial incentive to automate or ship high-paying jobs overseas.126 The
implications of these trends on the educational investment are captured by
Krugman: “It’s no longer true that having a college degree guarantees that
you’ll get a good job, and it’s becoming less true with each passing
decade.”127 It should be noted that Krugman is not arguing against
education; he is arguing that education no longer provides a sure route to
the middle-class.
When assessing the wisdom of any investment, it is important that
costs and potential payoff be considered together. Researchers have
estimated that the “break even” point for bachelor’s degree holders occurs
at about the age of 33.128 Based on this estimate, the typical worker with a
bachelor’s degree has ample time to realize a profit on his educational
investment.129 However, a few trends render this estimate less reflective of
today’s reality. Many students are attending college later in life, 130 thereby
reducing the amount of time they are able to profit from their educational
investment. Also, many students are taking longer to complete their
studies,131 a proverbial “double-whammy” that not only reduces the amount
of time they are able to profit, but also increases the amount of time
necessary to profit.132 In addition, education costs have continued to greatly
125

Blinder, supra note 121, at 32.
Martin Ford, Can a Computer Do a Lawyer's Job?, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 15 2011,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/02/can-a-computer-do-alawyers-job/71238/.
127
Krugman, supra note 120. See also id. (arguing that strengthening labor unions and
providing universal health care are more effective means of fostering prosperity than
education).
128
BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 7.
129
The educational investment (i.e. costs) consists not only of direct expenses, such as
tuition, but also opportunity costs, mainly in the form of lost income. See, e.g., id. at 4.
130
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADULT LEARNERS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BARRIERS TO
SUCCESS AND STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE RESULTS 3 (2007),
http://wdr.doleta.gov/research/FullText_Documents/Adult%20Learners%20in%20Higher%
20Education1.pdf.
131
JOHN BRIDGELAND ET AL., CIVIC ENTERPRISES, ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE 13 (2011),
available at http://www.civicenterprises.net/reports/across_the_great_divide.pdf (“[F]rom
1968 to 2007 the college completion rate remained relatively constant while time- todegree increased.”).
132
Increased time in school is associated with higher education costs. See, e.g., Nate
Johnson, Complete College America, Three Policies to Reduce Time to Degree 1 (2011),
available at
http://www.completecollege.org/docs/Three%20Policies%20to%20Reduce%20Time%20to
%20Degree%20-%20Nate%20Johnson.pdf. But cf., BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 13
(acknowledging that 43-53% of students work while enrolled and these earnings reduce
126
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outpace inflation,133 further amplifying salary stagnation and extending the
break-even point.
But even with these trends, most researchers still agree that higher
levels of education remain superior to lower levels in terms of investment
payoff—at least generally. So instead of “Education pays”, a more
appropriate tagline might be “Education can pay”, based largely on the type
of degree earned and the amount of time and money expended.
Irrespective of the risks, college participation continues to increase
and, along with increased education costs, has hastened the prominence of
another form of risk into the educational investment equation: student loans.

III. STUDENT LOANS AS “ENLIGHTENED SOCIAL POLICY”
Education access has been an “enlightened social policy”134 of the
federal government for more than a half century.135
The federal
government’s role in student financial aid was instigated in large part by
race-based and class-based college enrollment gaps.136 Policymakers
reasoned that financial aid would be an effective means of spurring
educational investments by members of underrepresented groups. The idea
of public investments in what is essentially a private (or individual)
endeavor has been justified based on the public benefits of an educated
populace and the public burdens of under-investments in education.137 The
education costs by reducing opportunity costs).
133
See, e.g., FEDERAL STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT AID:
STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2011-15 iii (2010),
http://federalstudentaid.ed.gov/static/gw/docs/FiveYearPlan_2011.pdf [hereinafter FSA
STRATEGIC PLAN] (“The average cost of postsecondary education has been rising far faster
than inflation, increasing the financial pressures on students and their families.”).
134
The Brunner court termed the federal government’s efforts to make student loans
accessible to students who would not qualify for loans in the private market “enlightened
social policy”. The policy objective was education access. In re Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756
135
The Higher Education Act of 1965 is said to have represented the first sign of a federal
commitment to access in higher education. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Gladieux & Jacqueline
E. King, The Federal Government and Higher Education, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUATION
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 151 (Philip G. Altbach et al. eds,,1999).
136
See, e.g., SANDRA R. BAUM, INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, FINANCIAL AIS TO
LOW-INCOME COLLEGE STUDENTS: ITS HISTORY AND PROSPECTS 5 (1987), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED377265.pdf (“The changed social attitude toward poverty
and society’s responsibility for economic conditions had created concern over the
imbalance in college attendance by race and family income.”).
137
CONG, BUDGET OFFICE, THE CONG. OF THE U.S., A CBO STUDY: COSTS AND POLICY
OPTIONS FOR FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN PROGRAMS 13 (2010), availabl at
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titans of the federal student aid policy are Pell grants and student loans.
A. Pell Grant
The Pell Grant Program was created by legislation in 1972 and is the
hallmark higher education need-based grant program.138 The program is
behemoth, with more than nine million recipients splitting grants totaling
$30 billion during the 2010-2011 school year.139 Very generally, Pell
eligibility is determined by the difference between a student’s cost of
attendance and her Expected Family Contribution (EFC).140 Any difference
between the cost of attendance and EFC is covered by a Pell grant up to the
Congressionally-stipulated maximum for that school year ($5,550 for 20112012).141 For example, a student with a cost of attendance equaling or
exceeding the maximum Pell grant and an EFC of $0 will receive the
maximum award. Students do not have to repay these grants, except under
very limited circumstances.142 The rapid growth of the program143 has
become a source of concern, if not consternation.144 Ironically, even though
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/110xx/doc11043/03-25-StudentLoans.pdf [hereinafter CBO
Study] (“The benefits of subsidizing education may also outweigh the costs when
education produces benefits for society in addition to the private benefits enjoyed by the
student. Students may fail to take those social benefits into account when making choices
about their education, which provides a case for government subsidization.”).
138
See, e.g., THOMAS J. KANE, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: RETHINKING HOW AMERICANS
PAY FOR COLLEGE (1999).
139
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2009-2010 FEDERAL PELL GRANT PROGRAM END-OF-YEAR
REPORT 1 (2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-200910/pell-eoy-09-10.pdf.
140
The Expected Family Contribution (EFC) is a formula computed using information
provided by a student in her Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). The EFC
is used to compute eligibility for various forms of student aid. FEDERAL STUDENT AID, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., YOUR FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: LEARN THE BASICS AND MANAGE
YOUR DEBT 39 (2010) [hereinafter MANAGE YOUR DEBT], available at
http://studentaid.ed.gov/students/attachments/siteresources/11-12YFSL.pdf. See generally,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL PELL GRANTS, FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET REQUEST P-3
(2010) [hereinafter PELL BUDGET REQUEST], available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget11/justifications/p-pell.pdf (explaining
how EFC is calculated).
141
PELL BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 140, at p-3.
142
A student may have to repay a Pell grant in some cases when she withdraws from
school. MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 4.
143
In the last decade, Pell expenditures have increased from about $8 billion to about $30
billion. In the past three years alone, expenditures have doubled, with most of that
increased coming over the last year. The number of grant recipients has increased 46%
over the last three years. PELL BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 140, at Table 1.
144
See, e.g., Richard Vedder, Pell-Mell, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 17, 2011, available
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costs associated with the program continue to skyrocket, the “buying
power” of the grants continues to decline.145
B. Student Loans
Federal student loans were first authorized in 1958 as part of the
National Defense Education Act.146 The initial program was extremely
limited compared to the system we have today. Roughly $300 million was
appropriated over four years for institutions to disburse as interestsubsidized loans to undergraduate students with financial need.147 During
the 1980s, student loans became the centerpiece of federal student aid
efforts. By 1985, student loans had grown to 50% of the federal aid
students received.148 In the time period spanning 2006-2012, federal
student loan volume more than doubled.149 The volume has increased
almost 400% since 1999.150 Since 2006, the number of students receiving
federal student loans has almost doubled—now totaling more than 25
million.151 And unsurprisingly, total outstanding federal student loan debt
at http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/pell-mell/28873 (proposing various reforms to
Pell program to reduce costs and increase “bang for our buck”).
145
The maximum Pell grant ($5,550 for 2011-2012) covers 32% of the in-state cost of
attending a public, 4-year college or university, down from 44% a decade earlier. The
buying power at private, 4-year colleges and universities has fallen from 17% in 1992 to
14% in 2012. COLLEGE BOARD TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: TRENDS IN STUDENT AID
2011 (2011) [hereinafter TRENDS IN STUDENT AID], available at
http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/Student_Aid_2011.pdf.
146
Statement of Alfred B. Fitt, General Counsel, Cong. Budget Office: Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education, Comm. on Education and Labor 3 (1979)
[hreinafter CBO Hearing], http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/52xx/doc5223/doc20.pdf.
147
The original law set the program length at 8 years. For every $9 in loan funds received
from the government, schools were required to add $1. Interest was set at 3%, essentially
the “cost of money”. Id.
148
BAUM, supra note 136, at 41.
149
For FY2006, total new volume through the Federal Family Education Loan Program
and the Federal Direct Student Loan Program was $58,864,000,000. In FY2012, volume
was $124,318,000,000. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR
2012 BUDGET REQUEST S-13 (2012) [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST],
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget12/justifications/s-loansoverview.pdf.
150
For FY1999, new student loan volume was $33,712,385,207. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
FEDERAL STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS - LOAN VOLUME UPDATES
(10/29/10) [hereinafter LOAN VOLUME UPDATES], available at
http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/opeloanvol.html (click on appropriate year
for spreadsheet listing data).
151
For FY2006, the total number of federal loan recipients was 13,667,000. For FY2012,
recipients totaled 25,124,000. FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 148, at S13. See, also, LOAN VOLUME UPDATES, supra note 149 (listing the number of FY1999
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has increased more than 540% since 2000, now totaling $807 billion.152
There are three types of federal student loans: Stafford, Direct
PLUS, and Perkins.153 By far, the largest of the three is the Stafford loan
program, accounting for 80% of new loan volume.154 Stafford loans come
in two forms: subsidized and unsubsidized.155 The interest on subsidized
loans is paid by the government while the student is enrolled in school at
least half-time and for a six month “grace period” thereafter; interest
accrues on unsubsidized loans from the point they are disbursed. 156 A
student can qualify for both forms of Stafford loans (up to applicable
maximums), with the subsidized amount being based on financial need.157
Direct PLUS loans are available to graduate and professional school
students and parents of dependent students.158 The purpose of PLUS loans
is to account for the difference between a student’s cost of attendance and
any other aid the student has received, including scholarships, grants, and
other loans.159 Interest accrues on PLUS loans from the point they are
disbursed.160 In addition, borrowers must pass a nominal check of “adverse
credit history”.161 Perkins loan eligibility is based on financial need. The
program is funded by a combination of federal and institutional funds; only
about 1,800 of the 2,900 institutions eligible to receive federal financial aid
funds participate.162
Most of these loans have to be repaid; however, the government
subsidizes loans mainly by offering them at lower interest rates than are
available in the private market and by tolling the accrual of interest for
certain students.163 Most federal student loans are offered without regard to
federal loan recipients was 8,766,922).
152
CBO STUDY, supra note 137, at Summary (listing the outstanding debt as $149 billion
in 2000). See, also, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 149, at S-20, 21
(listing outstanding debt figures for FY 2012).
153
MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 5.
154
CBO STUDY, supra note 137, at 1.
155
MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 5.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. See generally, Federal Direct Parent Plus Loan Information, Office of Student
Financial Aid, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, http://sfa.osu.edu/forms/award/plus.pdf (last
visited May 12, 2012) (listing grounds for PLUS loan denial as loan delinquencies,
“bankruptcy discharge, foreclosure, repossession, tax lien, wage-garnishment, or write-off
of Title IV debt during the last 5 years”).
162
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL PERKINS LOAN PROGRAM (2009),
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fpl/index.html.
163
See, e.g., CBO PAPER, supra note 103.
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credit rating.164 So the subsidies are greatest for individuals with bad credit,
as private lenders would likely impose higher interest rates.165 Moreover,
the subsidies serve the access goal mainly by providing a source of funds to
many individuals who would not qualify for private loans at all.166
Even though federal student loans were introduced in a climate of
“ideological and philosophical objections…to helping students by making
debtors out of them”,167 the programs’ scope and size have been continually
broadened, even against early Presidential objections.168 Today, with
outstanding student loan debt expected to soon top $1 trillion, surpassing
credit card debt,169 popular discussion of student loans is often captured in
ominous headlines warning of “bubbles” bursting and other financial
mayhem.170 So it seems that the ideological and philosophical differences
of yore are taking on new prominence as student loan debt reaches
uncharted levels. But like all forms of debt, student loans are a reflection of
larger trends, and the rise in student loan debt can be attributed to increased
college participation and increased education costs.171
C. Increased College Participation
Higher education has experienced explosive growth over the last 40
years. Between 1970 and 2009, enrollment in degree-granting institutions
more than doubled, from 7.4 million to 17.6 million.172 This growth is
likely to continue, as projections indicate that 19.6 million students will be
pursuing college degrees in 2020.173 Increases in college-going rates among
164

See, e.g., MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 8.
CBO STUDY, supra note 137, at 10 (“[T]he government furnishes a subsidy…whenever
it accepts terms on the financing it provides that are more favorable than the terms that
participants in private markets would demand to take on comparable obligations and
risks.”).
166
Id. at 24 (“[S]ome evidence suggests that federal policy has been effective at easing
[credit] constraints for most students.”).
167
Id. at 1.
168
CBO Hearing, supra note 146, at 3 (remarking in 1979 that Congress continued to
reauthorize and generously fund student loan programs over the objections of “every
president since President Eisenhower”).
169
Tamar Levin, Burden of College Loans on Graduates Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2011, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/education/12college.html?_r=4&hp.
170
See, e.g., Larry Doyle, Are Student Loans an Impending Bubble? Is Higher Education a
Scam?, BUSINESS INSIDER, May 2, 2011, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/arestudent-loans-an-impending-bubble-is-higher-education-a-scam-2011-5#ixzz1NW0MVtet.
171
See, e.g., CBO STUDY, supra note 137.
172
AUD ET. AL.., supra note 45, at 34.
173
Id.
165
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both “traditional” and “non-traditional” students have fueled the growth.174
In 2009, 52% of 20-21 year olds were enrolled in college, up from 32% in
1970.175 Similarly, 14% of individuals age 25-29, a non-traditional age
range, were enrolled in college in 2009, up from 8% in 1970. 176 Enrollment
increases have been spread across all sectors of higher education. Between
2000 and 2009, undergraduate enrollments at public, private, and for-profit
institutions increased 27%, 17% and 400% respectively.177
Postbaccalaureate enrollments have increased as well, rising from 1.6 million in
1983 to 2.9 million in 2009.178 All of these increases are projected to
persist at various levels through 2020.179
D. Increased College Costs
College costs of attendance have been on a steady rise for over 30
years. The average published in-state tuition and fees for a 4-year public
college or university was $8,244 in 2011-2012—an increase of 8% over the
previous school year.180 Public out-of-state tuition and fees increased 6% in
2011-2012, to $20,770.181 Tuition and fees at community colleges
increased 9%, to $2,963.182 Private 4-year colleges and universities saw an
increase of 4.5% in 2011-2012, to $28,500.183 The average among forprofit institutions increased 3%, to $14,487.184
The annual increases in college costs have outpaced inflation. The
decade from 2000 to 2009 saw yearly increases in education costs of 6.5%
per year at public 4-year institutions, 5.6% at private 4-year schools, and

174

FSA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 133, at 7 (defining traditional students as those who
“go to college directly after high school” and non-traditional students as “those who are 25
years old and above”).
175
AUD ET. AL.. supra note 45, at 138.
176
Id.
177
Public enrollments increased from 10.5 to 13.4 million; private enrollments increased
from 2.2 to 2.6 million; for-profit enrollments increased from 400,000 to 1.6 million. Id. at
34.
178
Id. at 36.
179
Id. (“Fall enrollment in postbaccalaureate programs is projected to increase through
2020 to 3.4 million students.”).
180
COLLEGE BOARD ADVOCACY & POLICY CENTER, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2011
(2011) [hereinafter TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING], available at
http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/College_Pricing_2011.pdf.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
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5.3% at community colleges.185 Since 2006, costs at for-profit schools have
increased 7.6% per year. Inflation during this period was about 2.5% per
year.186
The rise in educations costs is showing no signs of abating, with
further increases projected through 2015.187 If these increases continue at
the same rates, the costs of attending college in 2015 will be more than
double the costs in 2000.188 It is important to point out that not all students
pay the published tuition rate. After various forms of aid are applied, many,
if not most, students pay much less. But even net prices are higher today
than they were in 2000.189
Increases in college costs have played out in the context of stagnant
and declining wages. And while the cited reasons for the increases vary,190
the consensus seems to be that the increases are unsustainable.191 Families
are already responding strongly to the increased costs. The Gallup survey
found that 63% of families disqualified schools based on costs; this was 7%
higher than the previous year.192 Additionally, tuition increases were the
greatest worry among white, black and Hispanic parents.193 “Extreme”
worry about the economics of attending college increased as income-level
decreased.194 This finding, while intuitive, is a little ironic, given that
poorer students tend to pay lower net prices for college. The finding is also
troubling, given that negative perceptions of costs can depress enrollments
rates among groups that are already underrepresented in college.195

185

FSA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 133, at 5. See generally, AUD ET. AL., supra note 45,
at 132 (explaining that total cost of attendance “includes tuition and fees, books and
materials, and an allowance for living expenses.”).
186
Id.
187
Id. at 6.
188
Id.
189
AUD ET. AL.. supra note 45, at 128 (“For low-income, middle-income and high-income
families, the net price increased, respectively by $1,400, $2,200, and $3,600.”).
190
Taylor, supra note 26, at 749 (explaining that declining state funding for higher
education has prompted schools to raise revenue through tuition increases). See also, Dill,
supra note 18, at 143 (citing theory that asserts increased competition among institutions
for prestige has engendered tuition increases).
191
See, e.g., TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING, supra note 180, at 9.
192
GALLUP, supra note 104, at 43.
193
Concern about tuition increases exceeded those related to things like joblessness and
decreases in savings, investments, and home values. Id. at 54.
194
Id. (“More respondents from households with annual incomes of less than $35,000 were
extremely worried about all of the economic factors while many fewer families with
incomes of $150,000 or more reported being extremely worried.”)
195
See, e.g., BURDMAN, supra note 17.
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E. Increased Loan Reliance
Increases in student loan interest rates were the second biggest
worry among white, black and Hispanic parents.196 The parents’ concern
makes sense, given the extent to which their children will likely rely on
student loans to pay for college. The recession brought about a decline in
the availability of non-federal college funding sources.197 This declination
has coincided with a rise in student loan borrowing. During the 2008-2009
school year, 56% of full-time undergraduate students utilized students
loans;198 this was up from 45% during 1999-2000.199 The average loan from
all sources, including private loans, was $8,200 in 2007-2008 compared to
an inflation-adjusted $6,500 in 1999-2000.200
1. Degree Type
Comparing graduates who received their degrees in 2008 to those
who did so in 1996 illustrates a startling trend: bachelor’s degree recipients
who graduated in 2008 with debt borrowed $23,287, compared to $17,075
among 1996 graduates—a 36% increase; those who graduated with
associate’s degrees with debt borrowed $13,321 in 2008, compared to
$7,751 in 1996—a 72% increase; certificate program graduates with debt
borrowed $11,427 in 2008, compared to $7,300 in 1996—a 57%
increase.201 In addition, the percentage of graduates with more than
$15,000 in debt increased more than 50% between 1996 and 2008.202
About 17% of all bachelor’s degree graduates had debt of $30,500 or

196

GALLUP, supra note 104, at 53.
Not only did the recession decrease family, institutional, and state funding sources, it
also led to a decline in the availability of private student loans. The latter effect has led to
increased reliance on federal student loans. Federal loans offer much more favorable
repayment terms than private loans, including subsidized interest rates, multiple repayment
options, hardship deferments and forbearances, and no credit check. See, e.g., MANAGE
YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 6.
198
AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 132. See also, Program Integrity: Gainful Employment,
75 Fed. Reg. 142, at 101 (proposed July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668)
[hereinafter Program Integrity] (stating that at four-year institutions, more than half of fulltime students make use of student loans, compared to about 17% twenty years ago).
199
AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 126.
200
Id.
201
REBECCA HINZE-FIFER & RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE RISE OF
COLLEGE STUDENT BORROWING 5 (2010), available at
http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/social-trends-2010-student-borrowing.pdf.
202
Id. at 8.
197

28

UNDO UNDUE HARDSHIP

[DATE]

more—a threshold that is considered “high-debt”.203
2. Institution Type
Borrowing rates vary among different types of institutions, but they
have increased across all of them.204 Half of 2008 graduates of public
colleges and universities had student loan debt, compared to 46% in
1996.205 Among private institution graduates, borrowing rates increased
from 59% in 1996 to 72% in 2008.206 The largest increase, however, was in
the for-profit sector. Ninety-five percent of 2008 graduates borrowed
money for school, compared to 77% in 1996.207 Debt loads increased
across all institution types as well. Debt among graduates from public
institutions who borrowed increased almost 29%, from $15,599 among
1996 graduates to $20,087 among 2008 graduates.208 Private school
graduates saw their debt increase 41%, $19,852 in 1996 and $28,039 in
2008.209 During a shorter timeframe, 2004-2008, graduates with debt from
for-profit schools saw their debt increase about 10%, from $30,106 in 2004
to $33,046 in 2008.210
3. Socioeconomic Level and Race
Even though low-income students tend to pay lower net tuition, they
rely on student loans more heavily than other students. The typical lowincome student relied on loans to pay about 18% of the total cost of
attending college; middle-income and high income students relied on loans
for 15% and 7% respectively.211 There is a racial component to these
income-based borrowing trends, particularly as they relate to black students.
Black students disproportionately come from low-income households,212
203

SANDY BAUM & PATRICIA STEELE, COLLEGE BOARD ADVOCACY AND POLICY CENTER,
WHO BORROWS MOST? BACHELOR’S DEGREE RECIPIENTS WITH HIGH LEVELS OF STUDENT
DEBT 10 (2010), available at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/trends/trendswho-borrows-most-brief.pdf.
204
AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 128 (“When adjusted for inflation to 2009–10 dollars, the
average amount borrowed by students at each of the six major combinations of institution
level and control was higher in 2007–08 than in 1999–2000.”).
205
HINZE-PIFER & FRY, supra note 202, at 3.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 8.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
GALLUP, supra note 104, at 18.
212
A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform, 71 Mo. L. Rev. 919, 935
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and this trend contributes to disproportionately high debt levels. 213 Income
levels, however, do not fully explain the higher debt among black
students;214 institution choice plays a role as well. Seventeen percent of
black students attend for-profit institutions, which is almost double the next
highest proportion for other racial/ethnic groups.215 Students at for-profit
schools have the highest borrowing rates and debt in higher education.216
Additionally, students at for-profit institutions are more likely to be
classified as “independent”217 for financial aid purposes, and thus able to
borrow more money and accumulate more debt.218 Almost a quarter of
2008 graduates who were independent students are at or above the highdebt threshold of $30,500.219 Based on enrollment and borrowing trends,
black students likely make up a disproportionately high proportion of this
group.
High student loan debt would not be a problem if all borrowers
completed their academic or training programs and got jobs that paid
sufficiently high wages. In fact, under that ideal scenario, the concept of
“high debt” would not even exist. Alas, we do not live in Utopia, and there
are many people facing high student loan debt, low (or no) wages, and
unfulfilled college aspirations. When the latter takes the form of failure to
complete an academic or training program, it becomes particularly crippling
to realize a return on the educational investment. Failure to complete an
academic program is a strong predictor of student loan default.220 And
unfortunately, failure to complete is an all-too-common outcome in U.S.
higher education.

(2006).
213
BAUM & STEELE, supra note 203, at 6 (“High debt levels are more prevalent among
black bachelor’s degree recipients than among those from other racial/ethnic groups…
Twenty-seven percent of 2007-08 black bachelor’s degree recipients borrowed $30,500 or
more, compared to 16% of whites, 14% of Hispanics/Latinos, and 9% of Asians.”).
214
Id.
215
Other proportions are as follows: Hispanic: 10.1%, American Indian/Alaska Native:
9.4%, White: 7.4%, Asian/Pacific Islander: 5.2%. AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 273.
216
See, e.g., HINZE-PIFER & FRY, supra note 201.
217
According to federal student loan guidelines, an “independent student” is someone who
is “at least 24 years old, married, a graduate or professional student, a veteran, a member of
the armed forces, an orphan, a ward of the court, someone with legal dependents other than
a spouse, an emancipated minor, or is homeless or at risk of homelessness.” MANAGE
YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 40.
218
HINZE-PIFER & FRY, supra note 201, at 9.
219
BAUM & STEELE, supra note 203, at 3.
220
Program Integrity, supra note 198, at 102.
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IV. FAILURE TO COMPLETE AS INVESTMENT FAILURE
Higher education failure is a serious problem. Long the envy of higher
education in the world, the U.S. now has the highest failure rate among
industrialized countries.221 Today, almost half of individuals who begin an
academic or training program fail to complete.222 This trend is exemplified
in how the U.S. compares to other countries in terms of educational
attainment: Among individuals aged 55-64, the U.S. is first in higher
education attainment; 4th among 35-44 year olds; and 10th among 25-34
year olds.223 Younger generations are at risk of achieving the dubious
distinction of being less educated, proportionally, than their parents.224 So
while noteworthy progress has been made in broadening higher education
access, completion rates leave much to be desired. Fortunately, given the
level of public and private investments in higher education, the predominant
policy focus is shifting beyond access and beginning to encompass
completion.
A. Completion Rates
Completion rates vary across program and institution type. Overall,
57% of students who entered a 4-year academic program in fall 2002
graduated within 6 years.225 Put the other way, more than 40% of these
individuals did not complete their programs. Associate’s degree and
certificate completion rates are even more dismal. Only 27% of full-time
students who entered such programs in fall 2005 graduated within three
years.226 By institution type, 65% of bachelor’s degree seekers at private
schools completed their degrees, while only 55% of those at public
institutions did so—and, worse yet, only 22% of students at for-profit
schools managed to finish.227
Large disparities in completion exist across racial and ethnic lines.
221

PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY, supra note 66, at 10.
Id. at 38. But it is important to note that completion rates are measured in terms of
specific timeframes, usually 150% of the intended program length, and therefore do not
account for completion that occurs later. For example, failure to complete a 4-year
academic program within 6 years is considered non-completion, even if the student
completes the degree later. See, e.g., AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 72.
223
BRIDGELAND ET AL., supra note 131, at 7.
224
Id.
225
AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 72.
226
Id.
227
Id.
222
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Among white, black and Hispanic students in 4-year programs, completion
rates were 60%, 40%, and 49% respectively.228 The highest completion
rates were among students of Asian/Pacific Islander descent, at 67%; the
lowest were among Native Americans, at 38%.229 Among white, black and
Hispanic students in Associate’s or certificate programs, completion rates
were 29%, 23%, and 26% respectively.230 Asian/Pacific Islanders were the
only racial/ethnic group with a completion rate above 30%.231
Socioeconomic background characteristics have been found to influence
completion rates.232 A study of students at flagship public universities
found that income and parents’ education each influenced graduation
rates.233 On a whole, students from high-income backgrounds, with
college-educated parents, were found most likely to graduate from these
universities.234
The effects of socioeconomic factors on college participation and
completion are topics of intense inquiry. The interest is well-placed
because these factors likely provide much of the context in which disparities
play out. Socioeconomic background influences pre-college academic
preparation,235 college options and choices,236 and ability to pay237 in
intertwining fashion. Inadequate academic preparation diminishes college
participation and completion rates, disproportionately affecting students of
color and the poor.238 Inadequate academic preparation, along with

228

Id.
Id.
230
Id. at 73.
231
Id.
232
BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 34 (“High school graduates from low-income
backgrounds, those whose parents did not go to college, and black and Hispanic students
have lower college enrollment rates and much lower educational attainment rates than
others.”).
233
The graduation rate for high-income students was 83%, while the rate for low-income
students was 70%. After controlling for various background characteristics (e.g. entrance
exam scores), parents’ education and income level each contributed to the disparity. Id.
234
Id. at 40.
235
See, e.g., Michael Kirst, Secondary and Postsecondary Linkages, in ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY AND HIGHER EDUCATION 44 (Stacy Dickert-Conlin.& Ross Rubenstein eds.,
2007).
236
See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON & MORTON OWEN SCHAPIRO, THE STUDENT AID
GAME: MEETING NEED AND REWARDING TALENT IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 47
(1998).
237
Id. at 14 (stating that the failure of student aid to keep pace with rising education costs
has restricted access of low-income students to higher education).
238
Kirst, supra note 236, at 44 (discussing factors that lead to subpar pre-college education
of students of color and the poor).
229

32

UNDO UNDUE HARDSHIP

[DATE]

insufficient ability to pay, can often restrict college choices. 239 Insufficient
ability to pay can keep even academically qualified students from
completing college—or attending at all.240 With all of these factors at play,
it is easy to imagine how the disadvantages of poverty can compound,
diminishing an individual’s chances of completing college and resulting in
the disparities discussed earlier.
B. Cohort Default Rates
Short of bankruptcy, cohort default rates are the most direct
expression of educational investment failure. Cohort default rates represent
the percentage of federal student loan defaulters from a particular
educational institution.241 Calculating a school’s cohort default rate is
pretty straightforward—in theory, of course. The Department of Education
(ED) identifies a cohort by determining the number of former students who
went into repayment during a particular fiscal year. ED then determines the
number of individuals from that cohort who have defaulted on their student
loans during the “cohort default period” (usually about two years). The rate
is then calculated by dividing the number of defaulters by the total number
of individuals in the cohort.242 A cohort default rate above certain
thresholds could limit or eliminate a school’s eligibility for federal student
aid.243 Overall, cohort default rates were 8.8% for fiscal year 2009, up from
7% in 2008.244 Predictably, cohort default rates vary across institution type.
239

See, e.g., MCPHERSON & SCHAPIRO, supra note 237, at 47 (observing that “[l]owincome students are increasingly rare at four-year colleges and universities” due to
increased education costs).
240
Edward P. St. John, The Impact of Financial Aid Guarantees on Enrollment and
Persistence: Evidence From Research on Indiana’s Twenty-First Century Scholars and
Washington State Achievers Programs, in STATE MERIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS AND
RACIAL INEQUALITY 125 (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds., 2004), available at
www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/meritaid/fullreport04.php (arguing that millions
of academically prepared, low income students are being denied educational opportunities
due to financial difficulty).
241
The Department of Education calculates cohort default rates for every college or
university that receives federal financial aid funds. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., COHORT
DEFAULT RATE GUIDE, 2.1-1 (2006) [hereinafter COHORT DEFAULT RATE]
http://ifap.ed.gov/DefaultManagement/guide/attachments/CDRGuideMasterSept06.pdf.
242
Id. at 2.1 (providing a detailed explanation of how cohort default rates are calculated,
including an alternate method for schools with less than 30 student loan borrowers in a
cohort).
243
Id. at 2.4-3 (explaining the ramifications of having cohort default rates over 25% and
40%).
244
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIRECT LOAN AND FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOAN
PROGRAMS, INSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RATE COMPARISON OF FY 2007, 2008, AND 2009
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The fiscal year 2009 rates were 7.2% for public institutions, 4.6% for
private institutions, and almost 15% for for-profit institutions.245 Default
rates tend to increase over time, with those at for-profit schools increasing
at the highest rates among all institution types.246
C. “Gainful Employment” Rules
Other measures of repayment rates are also seen as proxies for
determining the extent to which an educational program is a good (or bad)
investment. The ED has implemented a highly controversial set of rules
which rely, in part, on repayment rates to determine whether an educational
program is providing “gainful employment” opportunities for students.247
The concept of gainful employment is rooted in the consumer protection
functions of the ED. All programs at for-profit institutions and those lasting
less than one year at public and private institutions must “prepare students
for gainful employment in a recognized occupation.”248 Historically, this
standard has been undefined, and therefore schools have not been required
to demonstrate compliance in any specific way.249 Repayment rates play a
central role in defining gainful employment and providing meaningful
benchmarks for assessing compliance.
For example, one path to
compliance requires programs to have an aggregate loan repayment rate of
at least 45%.250 Programs with repayment rates below 35% may be deemed
ineligible to receive federal financial aid funds.251
As an alternative to the loan repayment benchmarks, the rules also
COHORT DEFAULT RATES (2011),
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/instrates.html.
245
Id.
246
See, e.g., U.S. Gen Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, H. Subcomm. On Higher
Education, Lifelong Learning and Competitiveness, Proprietary Schools: Stronger
Department Of Education Oversight Needed to Help Ensure Only Eligible Students
Receive Federal Student Aid (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09600.pdf (showing default rates over a 2-, 3-, and 4-year
periods for various program types).
247
See, e.g., Goldie Blumenstyk, Despite Criticism, Education Department Moves Ahead
with 'Gainful Employment' Rule, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 8, 2011, available at
http://chronicle.com/article/Despite-Criticism-Education/127425/. See generally, Program
Integrity, supra note 200 (providing detailed presentation of proposed regulations).
248
Program Integrity, supra note 200, at 112.
249
Id. at 14.
250
Id. at 20 (explaining that “[t]he rate would be based on the total amount of loans repaid
divided by the original outstanding balance of all loans entering repayment in the prior four
Federal fiscal years”).
251
Id. at 17.
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provide standards based on debt-to-income thresholds. Programs for which
the typical former student has student debt payments that are less than 8%
of annual earnings and less than 20% of discretionary income are deemed
compliant with gainful employment standards. 252 On the other hand,
programs with debt-to-income ratios exceeding 12% of annual earnings or
30% of discretionary income would become ineligible for federal student
loan funding if their repayment rate is also below 35%.253
The minimum standards set out by the gainful employment rules are
policy statements. The ED is saying that repayment rates below 35% and
debt-to-income ratios exceeding 12% of annual earnings or 30% of
discretionary income represent intolerable levels of investment failure.
According to ED estimates, more than 255,000 students are enrolled in
programs that would be rendered ineligible under the gainful employment
rules.254 In other words, more than a quarter million students are at the
greatest risk of investment failure, typified by high student loan debt and
difficulty paying it. The bulk of these students are enrolled in for-profit
schools,255 and unfortunately these schools are often criticized for
questionable and inappropriate enrollment practices.256

V. INFORMATION ASSYMETRY AS INVESTMENT FRAUD
Educational investment decisions are filled with wide-ranging
uncertainty. Individuals who decide to invest in education must choose
among a dizzying array of schools and programs. Compounding the
inherent difficulties of this task is a lack of reliable information regarding
school quality or even programmatic content.257 Worse yet, students are
often unable to even ascertain the costs of their educational investments
beforehand, due to “complicated pricing structures”.258 The resulting
information asymmetry between schools and students contributes to what
252

Id. at 44. See generally, id. at 35 (describing how loan debt and income are calculated).
Id. at 44.
254
Calculations by author. Id. at 54.
255
Of the 3,000 programs that would fall below ineligible thresholds, about 65% would be
offered by for-profit schools, 30% by public schools, and 5% by private schools. Id. at 68.
256
See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 26, at 733 (describing the nature of misrepresentations and
fraud in higher education, particularly in the for-profit sector).
257
LONG, supra note 16, at 1 (“[W]ith little help families must sort through a complex
menu of postsecondary institutions that differ in terms of level, sector, and focus as well as
costs, admissions standards, and credentials and majors offered. Then they must put this
information in perspective with their own personal situations and preferences.”).
258
Id.
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can be termed “bounded rationality”—circumstances where a rational
person makes an irrational decision.259 Irrational educational decisions,
principally in the form of bad school choices, often lead to education
investment failure, and when this failure is the result of deception, it is akin
to investment fraud.
A. Difficulty Obtaining Information
Choosing a school is a critical educational investment decision.
When choosing a school, a student is not only deciding from where she will
hopefully receive a diploma; she is also deciding the type of program she
will undertake, which determines the credential she receives and the
minimum amount of time it will take her to complete the program.
Additionally, the choice of school can also determine the student’s chance
of completion; the educational “undermatch” phenomenon is an example of
this. Researchers have found that low-income students who enroll in the
most selective institutions for which they are qualified have a greater
chance of completing their program than their peers who undermatch.260 If
more students were aware of the importance of school characteristics, like
selectivity, and if more students had access to useful information about
these characteristics, there would probably be less bounded rationality
among those who choose to invest in higher education.
The choice of school is often influenced by costs; however, many
students lack reliable information about education costs and financial aid.
For example, about 850,000 students who would likely qualify for Pell
grants do not even bother to apply for them.261 Researchers tend to believe
this trend results from a lack of information, given the utter irrationality of
these students—the neediest—not pursuing such a favorable source of
financial aid.262 Students also lack basic awareness of financial concepts
that are relevant to determining education costs. In one study, only 27% of
respondents could correctly answer basic questions about interest rates,
inflation, and investment risk diversification.263 Socioeconomic factors
259

See, e.g., Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality, 2 ANNU. REV. POLIT. SCI. 298 (1999),
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/JonesBounded1.pdf.
260
BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 41 (‘“[U]ndermatching’ is defined as having test scores
and high school grades that would make acceptance at a very selective state university very
probable, but enrolling instead at a less-selective institution.”).
261
BURDMAN, supra note 17, at 4 (“Surprising numbers of low-income students—850,000
a year, or 26 percent, according to the American Council on Education— don’t apply for
federal aid at all, even though they would likely qualify for Pell Grants.”).
262
Id.
263
The researchers studied financial literacy among a nationally representative sample of
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influenced knowledge of these concepts.264 All these trends are troubling,
given research suggesting that knowledge of education costs and financial
aid options influence college participation, college choice, and, in the end,
college completion.265
B. Unscrupulous Practices
A particularly insidious manifestation of the information asymmetry
is deception and fraud. Some colleges, particularly those in the for-profit
sector, have been found to engage in deceptive and fraudulent practices in
order to encourage enrollment and, in the process, secure federal financial
aid funds.266 This deception is most often targeted at individuals who are
most likely to be duped by it.267
In 2010, a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
23-28 year olds. The researchers posed three questions of basic financial literacy, testing
knowledge of interest rates, inflation, and investment risk diversification:
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After
5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to
grow: more than $102, exactly $102, or less than $102? {Do not know; refuse to
answer}
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation
was 2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same
as, or less than today with the money in this account? {Do not know; refuse to answer}
Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a single company
stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” {Do not know; refuse
to answer}
Only 27% of respondents answered all three questions correctly, with 79% answering the
interest rate question correctly, 54% answering the inflation question correctly, and 47%
answering the investment risk diversification question correctly. ANNAMARIA LUSARDI ET
AL., FINANCIALLY LITERATE AMONG THE YOUNG: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONSUMER POLICY (2010),
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~alusardi/Papers/Financial_literacy_young.pdf.
264
Id. at 12.
265
See, e.g., id. at 8.
266
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT
COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED
IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES (2010) [hereinafter GAO
UNDERCOVER TESTING], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10948t.pdf.
267
Taylor, supra note 26, at 761 (asserting that “the most common targets of proprietary
school advertisements are poor, undereducated, and older” and thus “highly susceptible to
being persuaded by misrepresentations, due to their lack of insight about higher
education”).
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undercover investigation of 15 for-profit schools found deceptive, if not
fraudulent, enrollment practices at all of them.268 The deception related to
graduation rates, costs, and post-employment employment prospects and
salary—factors that are highly relevant to anyone attempting to determine
the prudence of an educational investment.269 For example, representatives
at two colleges guaranteed employment upon graduation and
representatives at five colleges inflated salaries.270 Additionally, at nine
colleges, undercover investigators were given deceptive information about
program duration or costs.271 Representatives at six colleges deceptively
told investigators that they were required to enroll prior to receiving
information about financial aid eligibility.272 Representatives at four
colleges encouraged investigators to falsify financial aid documents.273 One
representative even told an undercover investigator that “student loans were
not like car loans because ‘no one will come after you if you don’t pay.’”274
This investigation highlighted the pervasive nature of deception and fraud
in higher education, as well as the informational disadvantage at which
students often find themselves.
For schools, there are few disincentives to engage in deceptive or
fraudulent behavior when enrolling students. The maximum fine imposed
by the ED for a “substantial” misrepresentation is only $25,000, 275 a
nominal amount in the grand scheme of things. ED can strip a school of its
federal financial aid eligibility, but is reluctant to pursue such sanctions,
even when appropriate.276 Making matters worse, another GAO study
found the ED’s methods of detecting some forms of noncompliance with
financial aid rules to be inadequate.277 In addition, Federal Student Aid
(FSA), the division within ED that oversees federal student aid programs,
268

GAO UNDERCOVER TESTING, supra note 266, at 7.
Id. at 9.
270
Id. at 10.
271
Id. at 11.
272
Id.
273
The representatives’ encouragement of this fraud was inexplicable, given that the
investigators presented an ability to pay for the programs without financial aid. Id. at 7.
274
Id. at 12.
275
GAO UNDERCOVER TESTING, supra note 266, at 6.
276
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-10, HIGHER EDUCATION: STRONGER
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO ENFORCE BAN ON INCENTIVE PAYMENTS TO SCHOOL
RECRUITERS 33 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1110.pdf (“Education
officials also noted that they have not terminated a school for incentive compensation
issues. They were primarily concerned that schools would challenge terminations and
Education would need to invest resources in litigating cases without necessarily prevailing
in those terminations.”).
277
See, e.g., id. at 2.
269
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lists as a strategic priority the development of “compliance metrics” for
identifying schools that engage in deceptive or fraudulent behavior;278 the
implication being that current measures are inadequate.
1. Few Avenues for Redress
Schools that engage in deceptive or fraudulent practices are
protected by the courts, mainly though the doctrine of academic
abstention—a judicial “reluctance to intrude upon the inner workings of
[higher education] institutions.”279 The doctrine is a historical relic, tracing
its existence to a time when colleges were operated almost exclusively by
churches.280 Courts were reluctant to intrude upon the inner workings of the
church, and this reluctance extended to schools, as arms of the church.281
The doctrine, however, has persisted through the advent of public colleges
and universities and the secularization of most private schools. The primary
modern justification is premised on a judicially-held view that courtroom
fact-finders are unqualified to question the judgments of professional
educators.282
Adherence to academic abstention disadvantages victims of higher
education deception and fraud who seek redress in the courts. Causes of
action tend to be based on tort or contract law theories. In tort law,
fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and educational
malpractice are some of the most common theories of recovery. In contract
law, breach of contract is probably the most common theory. In each,
judicial reluctance or deference renders each theory ineffective at garnering
recovery for most plaintiffs.
Fraudulent misrepresentation is difficult to prove because scienter,
or intent to deceive, is difficult to prove. Typically, courts require high
levels of specificity when considering whether a misrepresentation is
fraudulent.283 Negligent misrepresentation is rendered mostly ineffective
because “courts are reluctant to impose a duty of care upon educational
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FSA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 133, at 21.
Taylor, supra note 26, at 763.
280
Kevin P. McJessy, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigating Educational
Liability Claims, 89 NW. U.L. REV. 1768, 1812 (1995).
281
Id.
282
Taylor, supra note 26, at 763.
283
See, e.g., Schwitters v. Des Moines Commercial Coll., 203 N.W. 265, 265 (Iowa 1925)
(characterizing representations made regarding the timeline for course completion and
post-graduation job acquisition as “no more than a prophecy” and thus not actionable as a
basis of recovery).
279
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institutions for their student outcomes.”284
Courts have cited the
collaborative nature of education in reasoning that there is no objective
standard of care that could be imposed upon schools.285 Courts have
rendered educational malpractice, another negligence-based theory,
effectively moot based on a host of considerations, including “inherent
uncertainties” about the causes of the harms being alleged and the potential
for a flood of litigation that could “overburden schools”.286 Montana is the
only state where an educational malpractice claim has been allowed to
proceed.287
Courts require that breach of contract claims allege that specific
promises were broken,288 thus leaving effectively no path to recovery for
plaintiffs who were duped by “legally vague, but practically convincing”
promises.289 And with a seeming nod to academic abstention, one court
articulated a standard that only those contract claims that allow the court to
make “an objective assessment” of whether the institution broke a promise
can stand; those that require the fact-finder to consider “educational
processes and theories” must be dismissed.290
The information asymmetry that characterizes the relationship
between schools and students fosters bad educational choices and aids
unscrupulous schools in deception and fraud. Both trends contribute to
investment failure, in the form of failure to complete. Unfortunately,
students who are victimized by lack of information or deceptive
misinformation are offered few options for redress. And when these
students leave school with crushing student loan debt, bankruptcy
represents only an inconsistent source of possible relief.

VI. BANKRUPTCY AS INCONSISTENT RELIEF
Currently, student loans are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, unless
the debtor can prove that paying the debt would be an undue hardship upon

284

Taylor, supra note 26, at 765.
See, e.g., Tolman v. CenCor Career Coll., 851 P.2d 203, 205 (Colo. App. 1992).
286
The other cited reasons for declining to recognize educational malpractice are familiar:
lack of a standard of care and a reluctance to “embroil the courts into overseeing the dayto-day operations of schools.” Ross v. Creighton, 957 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1992).
287
Id.
288
Id. at 416-17.
289
Taylor, supra note 26, at 767.
290
See Ross, 957 F.2d at 417.
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him and his dependents.291 Until the mid-1970s, however, student loans
were dischargeable like other forms of unsecured debt.292 The impetus
behind restricting student loan discharges was the image of an “about-to-be
wealthy graduate of medical school or law school” filing for bankruptcy
before attempting to make any student loan payments.293 These stories
fostered a perception that the federal student loan program was a
boondoggle of sorts, with crafty students benefitting at the literal expense of
the taxpayers. The overall increase in bankruptcies likely fueled these
perceptions.
In 1970, Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws in large part to study the causes of what the Commission termed “The
Rising Tide of Consumer Bankruptcies”.294 The Commission studied
allegations of abuse of student loan discharges and found only limited,
mainly anecdotal, evidence of such abuse.295 It nonetheless found the abuse
“reprehensible” and concluded that “it poses a threat to the continuance of
educational loan programs.”296 The Commission then recommended that
student loans be non-dischargeable during the first five years after entering
repayment, unless the debtor can prove an undue hardship.297 In 1976,
Congress implemented the Commission’s recommendation.298 Since then,
student loan discharge has been increasingly restricted. In 1988, the fiveyear period of non-discharge was extended to seven years.299 In 1998, the
seven-year period was removed altogether, leaving an undue hardship
determination as the only path to a student loan discharge. 300 Inexplicably,
Congress has failed to define undue hardship or provide any guidance to
judges in assessing each debtor’s situation. This ambiguity fosters
inconsistency at practically every juncture in the process of seeking a
student loan discharge.
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11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006).
COMM’N REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 207.
293
Id. at 209.
294
The Commission was made up of nine individuals appointed by the President of the
U.S., the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. The Commission was charged with studying and proposing reforms to the
bankruptcy system. See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at v, 1.
295
See id. at 176.
296
Id. at 176-77.
297
Id. at 177 (“The Commission, therefore recommends that, in the absence of hardship,
educational loans be nondischargeable unless the first payment falls due more than five
years prior to the petition.”).
298
COMM’N REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 209.
299
Id. at 212.
300
Huey, supra note 4, at 101.
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A. Overview of Bankruptcy
Debt is vital to the U.S. economy, as such, so is bankruptcy. The
relationship between the two is akin to that of an electrical current and a
circuit breaker. Essentially, bankruptcy serves as a means of relieving
pressure created by over-indebtedness.301 This relief system is critical to
the proper function of an economy centered around consumption.302
The function of debt is to facilitate consumption. Debt allows for
the immediate costs of consumption to be shifted to a later time, when
presumably increased financial resources will allow the debtor to pay those
costs.303 Student loans illustrate this function in classic fashion. Students
use loans to finance their current education consumption in hopes that their
education will allow them a future salary sufficient to pay off their student
loans. Using debt in this manner can be, and often is, prudent.304
When determining the prudency of taking on debt, rational
consumers attempt to account for future events, both expected and
unexpected, that may frustrate their ability to repay the debt.305
Unfortunately, not even the most conscientious debtor can predict the future
with certainty—and not every debtor is conscientious in the first place. So
over-indebtedness is inevitable,306 and when the pressures of overindebtedness become unmanageable, bankruptcy is the process through
which a debtor can receive relief. But in addition to relieving pressure on
debtors, bankruptcy protects creditors.307 These dual purposes—relieving
301

H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137 , at 61 (“[T]he ‘bankruptcy act . . . is designed to be a kind of
safety valve for the pressures generated by the conflicts which develop where the exchange
of goods and services takes place through multiple extensions of credit from a number of
unconnected sources.’”).
302
A. Mechele Dickerson, Consumer Over-Indebtedness: A U.S. Perspective, 43 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 135, 136 (2007) (“Americans are voracious consumers, but meager producers
and savers.”).
303
BETTI ET AL., STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF CONSUMER INDEBTEDNESS: STATISTICAL
ASPECTS 1 (2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/fina_serv/cons_directive/fina_serv06_en.pdf.
304
Id. (“When given the opportunity and in the right circumstances, we can observe that
many informed consumers successfully use debt to shift expenditure from one period of
their lives to another.”).
305
Id. (“The rational consumer takes into consideration the possibility of future serious
illness, unemployment or other potential negative events when he/she makes decisions such
as borrowing and makes the necessary precautions, such as insurance, to the extent possible
and appropriate.”)
306
Id. at 2 (“[L]ike indebtedness, over-indebtedness is a natural phenomenon that
inevitably touches a proportion of the population at any time and in any economic
circumstances.”).
307
See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 71.
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debtors and protecting creditors—create “a system born of conflict and
competing values”.308 Like over-indebtedness in the economy, conflict is
unavoidable in bankruptcy.309
1. History
The U.S. system of bankruptcy, with its dual concerns, is rather
distinct in history. Early bankruptcy laws originated in Europe and only
applied to merchants and commercial traders.310 Bankruptcy was an
involuntary process, primarily concerned with protecting creditors by
ensuring that the assets of debtors, particularly those deemed to be evading
debt obligations, were liquidated and distributed fairly.311 Under these early
laws, there was no discharge of unsatisfied debts,312 and debtors were
considered criminal “offenders.”313
The first bankruptcy law in the U.S. was promulgated in 1800 and
was modeled after the laws in Europe.314 However, the Act of 1841
fundamentally changed bankruptcy law by allowing for a voluntary action
and making it available to individual and other non-merchant debtors.315
The voluntary action introduced a largely unprecedented cooperative aspect
to bankruptcy law.316 This cooperative component was rooted in English
insolvency law, which was premised on providing a process by which an
“unfortunate debtor” could liquidate his assets among his creditors.317 In
essence, the 1841 Act provided a means for a debtor, recognizing his
financial situation, to file bankruptcy on his own terms, rather than at the
308

COMM’N REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 78.
Id. (asserting that bankruptcy “must remain unpopular and controversial” in order to
serve its dual purposes).
310
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 63 (“[Bankruptcy laws] germinated in the law-merchant of the
Italian states and elsewhere in continental Europe during the late Middle Ages as a weapon
against a commercial trader who ‘made bankrupt’ by flight from a mercantile center . . . or
. . . by concealment of his property.”).
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
Charles J. Tabb, Consumer Bankruptcy and Credit in the Wake of the 2005 Act: Abuse
or Protection? The Top Twenty Issues in the History of Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 9, 28 (2007) (remarking that bankrupt debtors were often imprisoned and
fraudulent bankrupt debtors could be put to death).
314
See id. at 11-12.
315
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 63.
316
In practice, cooperative bankruptcies were not completely unprecedented prior to the
1841 Act. Creditors and debtors would sometimes enter “friendly”, though still
involuntary, bankruptcies. Id. at 64.
317
Id. at 63.
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behest of a creditor. The fundamental goal of bankruptcy—the liquidation
and apportionment of debtor assets to creditors—did not change; but the
voluntary nature of the process represented a fundamental “sea change.”318
The Act was short-lived, as Congress repealed it after only thirteen
months;319 but voluntary bankruptcy became an enduring notion in future
legislation.
The Act of 1898 was the first permanent federal bankruptcy law; the
previous three acts—1800, 1841, and 1867—were all temporary pieces of
legislation.320 Debate over the bill lasted nine years,321 with debt discharge
representing a primary sticking-point.322 The law was based in large part on
a fiercely pro-creditor bill drafted by Senator Jay Torrey; however, prodebtor factions were able to influence the final bill in conference, and the
result has been characterized as “one of the most favorable pro-debtor relief
measures ever enacted.”323 The paramount form of debtor relief—the
discharge of debts—was included in the final bill. In fact, one Senator
called the discharge provisions “exceedingly liberal.”324
Like voluntary bankruptcy, debt discharge has persisted as a primary
component of bankruptcy law for more than 100 years. The enduring
legacy of debt discharge has been its role as the basis of a central objective
of bankruptcy—providing a debtor with a “fresh start”. The premise of the
fresh start was captured by the Supreme Court in Williams v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.:325 “to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.”326
In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,327 the Court characterized the idea of a fresh
start essentially as a means of integrating the bankrupt debtor back into the
economy as a productive wage-earner. The Court stated that preserving the
right of the debtor to exit bankruptcy with “a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort”328 was “of the utmost importance . . . because it
318

See Tabb, supra note 313, at 12.
Bradley Hansen, Bankruptcy Law in the United States, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA (Aug.
14, 2001) http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/hansen.bankruptcy.law.us.
320
Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or Progress? A Political History of
Bankruptcy Legislation in 1898 and 1998, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 344, 363 (1999)
(describing the bill’s permanency as “a radical idea at the time”).
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Id. at 354.
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Id. at 368.
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Id. at 367.
324
Id. at 376.
325
Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915).
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Id. at 554-55.
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Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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Id. at 244.
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is a fundamental private necessity [and] a matter of great public concern.”329
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 replaced the 1898
legislation.330 One of the primary aims of the new Act was to steer
bankrupt debtors away from filing under Chapter 7 and into Chapter 13.331
The idea behind this encouragement was a belief that creditors would get
paid more through Chapter 13 payments plans than they were under Chapter
7 liquidation.332 Unwilling to infringe upon debtor freewill, Congress
stopped short of compelling certain debtors into Chapter 13; rather it
provided incentives for such a filing.333 This policy decision demonstrated
that the voluntary nature of bankruptcy remained a very important ideal.
However, suspicion remained that some debtors who could afford to pay
some of their debts through Chapter 13 were nonetheless filing for the
broader discharge under Chapter 7. And in 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act334 passed.
The signature feature of the 2005 Act was a long-held priority of the
credit industry335—a “means test” that debtors must pass in order to file
under Chapter 7.336 The means test has been criticized as being sloppily
written;337 but, very generally, if a debtor’s income is above the applicable
median income for similar households in his state, he must show that his
disposable income falls below $100 per month or $6,000 over a five-year
period.338 While very few debtors are forced into Chapter 13 by the means
test,339 the fact that Congress was willing to infringe, even a little, upon the
329

Id. at 245.
Charles Jordan Tabb, The History Of The Bankruptcy Laws In The United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 23 (1995).
331
See id. at 35.
332
Id.
333
Id. (citing “super discharge” of certain debts that would not be dischargeable in Chapter
7 as an inducement for filing Chapter 13); see also id. at 36 (remarking that Congress
granted courts the power to dismiss Chapter 7 filings that amounted to “substantial abuse”
of the system, meaning it was very clear that the debtor could afford to pay some of his
debts).
334
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (2005).
335
COMM’N REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 90 (noting in 1997 that“[t]he credit industry
has sought means testing consistently for at least 30 years”).
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Dickerson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 939.
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See, e.g., Chelsey W. Tulis, Get Real: Reframing the Debate over How to Calculate
Projected Disposable Income in § 1325(b), 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 345, 358, 360 (2009)
(describing how “confusing” language has led to conflicting interpretations of the means
test).
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See Dickerson, supra note 212, at 939 (providing a detailed explanation of the means
test).
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Michelle J. White, Consumer Bankruptcy and Credit in the Wake of the 2005 Act: Abuse
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debtor sanctity of choosing under which Chapter to file is significant.
Some of the most recent bankruptcy reforms were hastened by
precipitous increases in the number of bankruptcy filings. The 1970
Commission noted that between 1946 and 1967, the total number of
bankruptcies increased from 10,196 to 208,329, with 191,729 being
personal bankruptcies.340 The work of this Commission influenced the
1978 Act.341
A second Commission, formally titled the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission, was established in 1994,342 largely in
response to the 1.2 million personal bankruptcies that year. So in the less
than 30 years between the two Commissions, the number of personal
bankruptcies increased more than six-fold. In 2010, there were more than
1.5 million personal bankruptcies,343 the highest amount since the record 2
million in 2005.344
As the number of bankruptcies has risen, Congress has excepted an
increasing number of debt types from discharge. When a debt is excepted
from discharge, it survives bankruptcy, and the debtor remains responsible
for paying it. Thus, discharge exceptions are direct infringements upon the
notion of a fresh start. Pre-1978, discharge was essentially an all-or-nothing
proposition; the 1978 Act included nine discharge exceptions; the 2005 Act
includes nineteen.345 Some debts are excepted based on public policy
reasons; for instance, debt incurred through fraud cannot be discharged.346
Other debts are excepted due to “the inherent nature of the obligation”.347
One such excepted debt is student loans. The oft-espoused “inherent
nature” justification is that the viability of the student loan program depends
or Protection? Economics of Bankruptcy Reform under BAPCPA, 2007 U.ILL. L. REV. 275,
291 (2007) (calculating that less than 1% of bankrupt debtors were forced into Chapter 13
because of the means test). See, also, e.g., Christian E. Weller et al., Estimating the Effect
of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 on the
Bankruptcy Rate, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327 (2010) (noting that while the Chapter 7 filing
rate decreased after passage of the 2005 Act, this decrease was likely temporary).
340
COMMISSION REPORT1973, supra note 9, at 2.
341
COMMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at ii.
342
Id. at 47.
343
U.S. BANKRUPTY COURTS—BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS CASES COMMENCED BY
CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12 MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER
31, 2010 t. F-2 (2011)
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2010/
1210_f2.pdf.
344
The number of bankruptcies in 2005 was likely inflated by debtors clamoring to file just
before the new, more restrictive, bankruptcy laws took effect in October of that year.
Dickerson, supra note 302, at 148.
345
Tabb, supra note 330, at 7.
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COMMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 179.
347
Id.
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on debtors making good on their obligations.348
B. Undue Hardship Standard
Bankruptcy courts have struggled with the mere definition of undue
hardship. Should the words be construed literally or conceptually? Should
the words be defined separately or together? The In re Heckathorn court
stated that undue hardship was a “phrase with a particular legal meaning
and function”.349 Conversely, the In re Skaggs court reasoned that “the
plain, ordinary meaning” of the words was sufficient in taking a “common
sense” approach to defining the concept.350
Some courts seem to struggle with determining the extent or degree
of hardship that should be embedded in their definitions, suggesting that
“undue” is the more problematic component of the concept. The In re
Brunner court stated that “garden-variety” hardships are not “undue.”351
The court suggested that undue hardship required a “certainty of
hopelessness” about a debtor’s ability to fulfill her payment obligations.352
In contrast, the court in Kopf v. Dep’t of Educ.353 stated that a “certainty of
hopelessness” standard is antithetical to the fresh start ideal; thus, it applied
a standard that only required debtors to show a “reasonable” chance that
paying their loan would force them to live below a “minimal standard of
living.”354 Frustrated by the ambiguous standards and thresholds applied in
undue hardship cases, the In re Bryant court tied undue hardship to federal
poverty guidelines—an objective benchmark.355 According to the court, if a
debtor’s net income is “at, near or below” the poverty rate or if a debtor’s
income is above the rate, but she has sufficiently “unique” or
“extraordinary” expenses, the payments represent an undue hardship.356 So
the degree of hardship required by courts has ranged from “reasonable” to
“certain” and has been tied to poverty rates.
Most courts agree that in order for a hardship to be “undue,” it must
348
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persist into the future. The Heckathorn court stated that in addition to
demonstrating current inability to pay, debtors are expected “to show also
that they cannot reasonably be expected to make payments…in the
foreseeable future.”357 The In re Coleman court characterized the debtor’s
threshold burden as proving “that he does not now, and will not in the
future, have the funds available from which to repay the student loan.”358
However, the Skaggs court, with its plain meaning approach, reasoned that
current inability to pay, by itself, could represent an undue hardship.359
1. Tests
Some courts have devised multi-faceted tests essentially to detect an
undue hardship when considering a debtor’s case.
a. Brunner
The most popular test was devised by the Brunner court.360 The
Brunner test requires debtors seeking a student loan discharge to show the
following three things:
1) that the debtor cannot, based on current income and
expenses, maintain a "minimal" standard of living for
himself or herself and his or her dependents if forced to
repay the loans, 2) that this state of affairs is likely to persist
for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
student loan, and 3) that the debtor has made good faith
efforts to repay the loans.361
In essence, the test requires debtors to show that their loan payments
would require them to sacrifice basic necessities, both presently and for a
number of years in the future, and that they have made reasonable attempts
to repay the debt. The subjectivity and ambiguity are apparent, even in this
truncated explanation. What is a “minimal standard of living”? 362 How is
357
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inability to pay for “a significant portion of the repayment period”
predicted?363 What constitutes “good faith efforts”?364 These are all
questions that remain unclear because undue hardship remains undefined.
b. Johnson
Some courts have chosen to adopt the test devised by the In re
Johnson court.365 Under this test, debtors are required to pass an “undue
hardship” test that accounts for their current and future sources of income
and their expenses.366 Debtors must show, given their expenses, their
income is insufficient to meet their loan obligations. Their expenses must
be “reasonable” in order to pass scrutiny.367 Debtors who pass the undue
hardship test must then pass either a “good faith” test or a “policy” test.
The Johnson good faith test requires debtors to have made attempts to repay
the loan; in making this assessment, the test looks at debtor attempts at
finding employment, minimizing expenses, and maximizing income. 368 If a
debtor fails the good faith test, the court will apply a policy test. The
purpose of the policy test is to assess whether granting the discharge would
represent an abuse of the bankruptcy laws.369 This assessment hinges
largely on the percentage of the debtor’s total debt that is made up of
student loans.370 The higher the percentage, the more likely courts will
view a discharge as abusive. The test also considers the financial benefit
the debtor has received from her education.371 Debtors who have received
little or no benefit are more likely to have their loans discharged.
In summary, the Johnson test requires debtors to first demonstrate
that their current income is insufficient to make loan payments and this
insufficiency will persist. They must also show that their expenses are
reasonable. They must then show either that they have made diligent
attempts to pay the loans by maximizing income and minimizing expenses
subjectivity into what should be a straightforward financial calculation.”).
363
Id. at 198 (describing attempts by the Ninth Circuit to apply objective factors to
determine future inability to pay, but lamenting that a “multifactor test within a multifactor
test” is not “a realistic way to accomplish consistent results.”).
364
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or that they have received little financial benefit from their education and
discharging student loans is not their overwhelming reason for filing
bankruptcy. Like Brunner, critical elements of the Johnson test are based
on ambiguous concepts.
c. Bryant
The least popular test is the most objective. As stated earlier, the In
re Bryant court attempted to devise an objective test by tying undue
hardship to net income and poverty benchmarks. In an effort to minimize
subjective “moral judgments”, the court assumes pre-bankruptcy good faith
on the part of debtors.372 But the process of determining net income can be
knotty when a debtor is claiming unique or extraordinary expenses;
creditors can challenge the uniqueness or extraordinariness of these
expenses.373 But of all the tests, the Bryant test makes the most explicit
effort to base undue hardship determinations on an objective measure.
d. Totality of the Circumstances
Some courts eschew reliance on tests altogether. These courts tend
to take a “totality of the circumstances” approach to making undue hardship
determinations. Recognizing that there was no “universally accepted” test
of undue hardship,374 the Coleman court stated “rigid adherence…to a
particular test robs the court of the discretion envisioned by Congress” in
devising the undue hardship standard.375 The court further stated that “[a]n
undefined and illusive concept such as ‘undue hardship’ should result from
a fact-sensitive analysis based on the totality of the circumstances.” 376 As a
result, the court adopted a nine-prong test that assessed the debtor’s revenue
and expenses; past job history; rate of pay; skills and education;
maximization of income; prudence of expenses; cause of insolvency; any
medical problems; and any dependents.377
The Kopf court adopted a three-prong test that assessed a debtor’s
past, present, and future income; his living expenses; and other relevant
factors, such as medical problems. In eschewing the prevailing tests, that
court reasoned that Johnson and Brunner “[tested] too much”, specifically
372
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good-faith (in the case of both tests) and policy (in the case of Johnson).378
Oddly, Bryant was disregarded not on its merits, but because few other
courts had adopted it.379 Substantively, the Kopf and Coleman totality
approaches are very similar; the primary difference is how factors are
categorized. In Kopf, “other circumstances” acts as a catchall capturing
many of the factors that Coleman specifically enumerates.380 The problem
with both approaches is that they embrace the subjectivity and moral
judgments that lead to inconsistent undue hardship determinations.
2. Relief
The ambiguity of the undue hardship standard has fostered another
area of inconsistency: undue hardship relief. Three approaches have
emerged when determining appropriate relief when undue hardship is
found: full discharge, partial discharge, and “hybrid” discharge.
Unfortunately, Congress has failed to provide clarity, and therefore courts
continue to grapple with this issue.
a. Full Discharge
Courts that view undue hardship relief as a full, all-or-nothing,
proposition typically base their approach on what they view as the plain
language of the statute. For example, the Skaggs court reasoned that the
plain-meaning definition of “debt” in the Bankruptcy Code encompasses the
entire debt, not some part.381 According to the court, Congress could have
used language authorizing partial discharge, but chose not to do so, 382 and
“courts are not granted power to remedy perceived defects in legislation.”383
b. Partial Discharge
Courts that grant partial discharges base their approach on the equity
function of bankruptcy and their interpretation of Congressional intent. The
Heckathorn court emphasized that the bankruptcy process is “embedded in
equity;”384 as such, courts are allowed, if not required, to grant partial
378
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discharges where appropriate. The court also reasoned that because “[t]he
words ‘undue hardship’ suggest a matter of degree”, viewing discharge
from an all-or-nothing perspective would lead to “absurd” results, in light of
Congress’s goals of providing fresh starts and maximizing student loan
payments.385 In essence, discharging loans to the extent that they represent
an undue hardship—and no more—will result in debtors getting the relief
Congress intended while ensuring that they still pay what they can.
The Skaggs court characterized the arguments in favor of partial
discharges thus: Courts that only grant full discharges reward “irresponsible
debtors who create their own hardship by borrowing excessively and
unrealistically for their education, while punishing the debtor who has
borrowed more frugally and for whom, therefore, repayment is not an
‘undue hardship.’”386 As the arguments goes, all-or-nothing approaches
incentivize excessive student loan indebtedness. The Skaggs court
concluded, however, that such arguments were “better made to Congress
than to the courts.”387
c. Hybrid Discharge
The hybrid discharge approach is essentially an amalgamation of the
full and partial discharge approaches. Courts that grant hybrid discharge
agree that the plain-language of the undue hardship standard does not allow
for partial discharge of aggregate student loan debt.388 But these courts also
agree that bankruptcy is an equity process and all-or-nothing discharges
may not adequately serve this function.389 Hybrid courts resolve these
seemingly contradictory views by reasoning that while aggregate debt
cannot be partially discharged, individual loans making up that aggregation
can be discharged as necessary to prevent undue hardship. 390 In other
words, if a debtor has multiple student loans (as is often the case), some of
those loans can be discharged while others can be deemed nondischargeable. In fact, hybrid courts reason that treating separate debts
collectively runs afoul of the plain language of the undue hardship
statute.391
The In re Grigas court determined which of the debtor’s fifteen
385
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loans were dischargeable by first determining that $224 was the maximum
monthly student loan payment the debtor could make without experiencing
undue hardship.392 The court then considered each loan in chronological
order, oldest to newest, to ascertain whether it could be paid in full within
15 years, using $224 per month as the original benchmark. 393 Through this
process, as loans are deemed fully payable, and therefore nondischargeable, the monthly amount is adjusted accordingly, leaving less
money to pay later loans.394 For example, if Loan #1 was fully payable in
15 years at $100 per month, Loan #2 would have to be payable in 15 years
at no more than $124 per month in order to be non-dischargeable. If a loan
is too large to be fully repaid, that loan would be discharged and later loans
would be considered until the maximum monthly allotment is depleted.395
This method advantages older loans and smaller loans.
3. Empirical Studies
An empirical study of student loan discharge cases confirmed that
the ambiguity of the undue hardship standard resulted in inconsistent
decisions. Researchers reviewed undue hardship determinations rendered
between October 7, 1993 and October 6, 2003.396 In total, the researchers
reviewed 286 determinations, representing every federal circuit and 70% of
the federal districts.397 The researchers found that 57% of the debtors were
granted some form of undue hardship relief.398 When the researchers
compared the group that received relief to the group that did not, they found
an “overall lack of dissimilarity”399—meaning the two groups were virtually
identical in relevant ways. For example, the researchers found no
statistically significant difference in the median monthly disposable
household income,400 median levels of student loan debt, or median debt-to
household ratios of the two groups.401 The researchers did find an
392
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association between health problems and the granting of undue hardship
relief, but concluded that the existence of health problems alone could not
explain why some debtors received relief and others did not.402 As such, the
researchers concluded that “problems of uncertainty and unequal treatment
of debtors” were rife in undue hardship cases, “[undermining] the integrity
of the system by producing haphazard results.”403
Another study by the same researchers found that the extent of
undue hardship relief was based on factors other than those relevant to
debtors’ ability to repay their loans. The researchers studied 115 undue
hardship proceedings that had been commenced between January 1, 2002
and December 31, 2006 and resolved by August 2007.404 They chose to
base their study in the Western District of Washington because it “appears
to be a microcosm of the rest of the nation.”405 In 57% of the 115 cases,
debtors received some form of undue hardship relief.406 A quarter of
debtors who received relief were granted full discharges; half were granted
discharges of about 71%.407 The average discharge was 62%.408 The
researchers identified five determinants of the extent of discharge.409 Three
of the five determinants were counsel’s years of experience; the identity of
the judge assigned to the case; and whether the case was settled or went to
trial.410 These are all factors that should be irrelevant to determining the
merits of an undue hardship case; however, they make up a majority of the
factors that determine undue hardship relief.
These findings provide compelling support for a new framework for
determining the propriety of student loan bankruptcy discharges. This
framework should be unambiguous and objective, thereby lending
consistency to student loan discharge cases.
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VII. DEBT SERVICE THRESHOLDS AS OBJECTIVE BENCHMARKS
This section will present a framework for using debt service
thresholds to determine the propriety of federal student loan bankruptcy
discharges. The framework is centered around debt service thresholds
because they provide critical, albeit less than absolute, objectivity to a
process that is woefully subjective. The goals of the framework are twofold: 1) to provide an impartial, economical, and uniform means of
assessing the propriety of student loan discharges, and 2) to provide debtors
facing crushing student loan debt and few prospects for repaying it with a
simplified avenue of relief in bankruptcy.
The 1994 Bankruptcy Commission lamented the “luck-of-the-draw
justice” endemic of bankruptcy litigation.411 The Commission noted that
throughout its review it heard complaints from debtors and creditors alike
regarding inconsistency and subjectivity across the system.412 Before that,
the 1970 Bankruptcy Commission observed that the “lack of uniform
standards creates many variations in district court practices, and they, in
turn, cause unequal treatment of creditors and debtors.”413 That Commission
also identified four objectives of the administration of bankruptcy laws.414
Three of the four—impartiality, economy, and uniformity—are frustrated
by inconsistency and subjectivity. As such, bankruptcy laws should be
clear, allowing for fair, efficient, and consistent resolution of cases.
Simplicity is an essential component of any rule intent on fostering
consistent results. As argued by the 1994 Commission, “[a] relatively
simple standard reduces litigation costs while it increases the predictability
of outcomes…A simple standard also promotes consistency in application
among different judges and different districts, increasing the likelihood that
similar cases will be analyzed using similar legal principles.”415 The 1970
Commission tied simplicity to access to bankruptcy. It warned that the cost
411
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of bankruptcy litigation “is often disproportionate to the amounts of money
involved,” resulting in “genuine controversies” being left unresolved.416
This point is important because many commentators have argued that “[t]he
borrowers most likely to prevail [in bankruptcy] are those with the least
possibility of being able to litigate the question.”417 As a result, the 1970
Commission concluded that “substantive laws, procedural rules, and
administrative practices should be simplified and clarified to permit broader
debtor, creditor, and counselor participation [in the bankruptcy process].”418
Accordingly, “elaborate adjudication should be the exception, not the
rule.”419
As discussed earlier, the fresh start notion and the post-bankruptcy
discharge of debts are integral components of bankruptcy law. However,
the subjective and restrictive nature of the undue hardship standard renders
these integral notions needlessly speculative for debtors facing crushing
student loan debt and few prospects for repaying it. The following
proposed framework represents an impartial, economical, uniform and
simplified alternative to the undue hardship standard.
A. Proposed Framework
In order to be eligible for discharge of federal student loans obtained in
a bachelor’s degree (or lower) program:
 The debtor must have been in repayment for at least five years.
In order to be eligible for discharge of federal student loans obtained in
a graduate or professional school program:
 The debtor must have been in repayment for at least ten years.
In addition, the following criteria would apply to all debtors seeking
federal student loan discharge:
 The debtor must have participated in the federal Income-Based
Repayment (IBR) Plan or a similar plan for at least three years for
all student loans for which discharge is being sought.
 The debtor’s Standard monthly payment amount (aggregated over
the year) must have been above applicable maximum debt service
thresholds for five consecutive years leading up to discharge.
416
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Upon discharge of student loans:
 The debtor is ineligible to receive future federal student loans,
unless discharged loans are reaffirmed.
1. Mandatory Repayment Periods
As the Heckathorn court stated, some level of debt-induced hardship
is to be expected early in one’s post-college career.420 As such, the purpose
of the mandatory repayment periods is to allow debtors an opportunity to
realize some benefit from their education and to make loan payments before
resorting to bankruptcy. The mandatory repayment periods would be
exclusive of grace periods, deferments, forbearances, and any other periods
during which the debtor is not required to make payments. The time
periods can be non-consecutive.
The five-year mandatory repayment period for bachelor’s degree (or
lower) program debtors is borrowed from the original recommendation by
the 1970 Commission that was later adopted by Congress in 1976. The tenyear mandatory repayment period for graduate and professional school
program debtors mirrors the length of the Standard repayment period for
federal loans.421
The purpose of the longer mandatory repayment period for graduate
and professional school debtors is to allow them ample time to realize a
payoff from their education before seeking discharge. As discussed earlier,
wages for workers with graduate or professional degrees exceed those
associated with lower levels of education, and those wages have increased
very robustly over the last 30 years. Moreover, economic trends suggest
that these workers will have an increasing advantage in the scrum for stable,
well-paying employment going forward.
BLS projects that through 2020, job growth will be greatest in
occupations that require a master’s degree, followed by those requiring a
doctoral or professional degree.422 Thus, a longer mandatory repayment
period for these debtors is reasonable, given the favorable employment
prospects afforded highly educated individuals in this country. And to the
420
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extent that the solvency of the federal student loan program would be
threatened by this framework, debtors in the best position to leverage their
education in the job market should be encouraged to make payments on
their loans, even if through an income-based plan.
2. Participation in Income-Based Repayment Plan
The requirement that debtors participate in a federally-sponsored
income-based repayment plan for at least three years is intended to ensure
that debtors take advantage of options other than bankruptcy before seeking
discharge. By reducing the debtor’s monthly payment, such plans may be
effective at directing debtors away from bankruptcy.
Currently, the federal government offers three income-based student
loan repayment plans: Income-Based Repayment (IBR) Plan; Income
Contingent Repayment (ICR) Plan; and Income-Sensitive Repayment
Plan.423 IBR is the broadest of the plans, with applicability to all types of
federal student loans,424 rendering the other plans virtually obsolete.
Through IBR, debtors are required to pay no more than 10% of their
“disposable income”—defined as the difference between their Adjusted
Gross Income and 150% of the poverty level.425 The difference between
payments made under the Standard plan and the IBR Plan can be significant
for some debtors, with the latter being lower.426 Monthly payments are
adjusted each year based on the debtor’s family and financial situation, and
after 20 years, any remaining loan balance is canceled.427
3. Maximum Debt Service Thresholds
Debt service thresholds will be used to determine whether a debtor’s
student loan payments are high enough to warrant discharge. Debt service,
often expressed as a percentage, is essentially a measure of indebtedness.428
Unfortunately, there is no universally agreed upon definition or numerical
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threshold of over-indebtedness.429
Thus, defining what constitutes
excessive debt is an inherently arbitrary exercise. With that said, however,
there are generally accepted benchmarks that are relied upon by loan
underwriters and others who seek to assess loan risks.430 And while these
benchmarks are not applicable to every debtor’s situation, they are
nonetheless helpful at providing common bases upon which to assess a
range of debtors.
The maximum debt service thresholds for this framework were set
using as guidance a model developed by researchers at the College Board.
The College Board model uses income levels and the poverty rate to
determine the maximum annual amount a debtor can dedicate to student
loan payments.431 The model determines maximum annual student loan
payments by applying a uniform debt service of 20% to an individual’s
“disposable income”—defined as income above 150% of the poverty
threshold.432
The framework proposed in this article is less generous than the
College Board model. Maximum debt service thresholds begin at 20% and
reach as high as 30% of a debtor’s disposable income. This graduated
approach acknowledges, albeit somewhat arbitrarily, that individuals “with
higher incomes can afford to devote a higher proportion of their incomes to
debt payments without sacrificing basic expenditures.”433 In addition, the
College Board’s threshold is intended to be a prudency standard, not
necessarily a measure of when bankruptcy discharge is appropriate.
The maximum annual amount a debtor can dedicate to student loan
payments is calculated in the following manner:
 Determine “disposable income” by calculating the difference
between the debtor’s gross income and 150% of the federal poverty
threshold for similarly-situated debtors.434 Gross income is defined
as income from all sources, including employment and domestic
429
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support. If the debtor is married and not separated, spouse’s income
is also included in the gross income calculation.
The following student loan debt service thresholds are then applied
to the disposable income calculation:
$1-49,999 (disposable income): 20% (debt service threshold)
$50,000-74,999: 22.5%
$75,000-99,999: 25%
$100,000-124,999: 27.5%
$125,000+: 30%

So a debtor with gross income of $40,000 and a family size of three
(including the debtor herself) will have disposable income of $12,205—
which is the difference between the debtor’s gross income and 150% of the
poverty threshold ($27,795) for her family. The applicable student loan
debt service threshold is 20%--which means that for purposes of her
bankruptcy petition, the maximum amount this debtor could dedicate to
student loan payments for the year in question is $2,441, or 6% of her gross
income. Student loan obligations above that amount would render the
payments, in effect, an undue hardship for that year.
Higher gross income or smaller family size can lead to higher
maximum annual student loan payments. For example, a debtor with gross
income of $60,000 and a family size of three would have disposable income
of $32,205 ($60,000 - $27,795). The applicable student loan debt service
threshold is 20%--which means that for purposes of his bankruptcy petition,
the maximum amount this debtor could dedicate to student loan payments
for the year in question is $6,441, or about 11% of his gross income.
A debtor with gross income of $40,000 and a family size of one
would have disposable income of $23,665 ($40,000 - $16,335). The
applicable student loan debt service threshold is 20%--which means that for
purposes of her bankruptcy petition, the maximum amount this debtor could
dedicate to student loan payments for the year in question is $4,733, or
about 12% of her gross income.
4. Five Years of Above-Maximum Payments
In order to be eligible for discharge, the debtor’s monthly payments
(aggregated over the year) must exceed the stipulated maximum amounts
for five consecutive years. Calculations will be made for each relevant year
to account for changes in salary, poverty thresholds, and payment
obligations.
The Standard repayment plan will be used to determine payment
obligations, even if the debtor made payments under an income-based plan.
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The proposed framework requires debtors to enroll in such a plan, in order
to lower their monthly payments. But relying on these lower payments in
determining eligibility for discharge would essentially punish the debtor.
Thus, reliance on the Standard plan (which represents the maximum most
debtors can be obligated to pay) is premised on the idea that debtors should
not be punished for attempting to lower their payments and exhaust options
short of discharge.
Further, an income-based repayment plan should not be considered a
substitute for bankruptcy discharge. One court argued that such a
consideration allows judges to abdicate their responsibility of determining
appropriate bankruptcy relief.435 Additionally, adherence to an incomebased repayment plan can yield a non-dischargeable tax obligation for the
debtor. For example, after 20 years of making payments through the IBR
Plan, any remaining loan balance is canceled; but the debtor may be
required to report this canceled balance as taxable income.436 As the
Bronsdon court put it, debtors should not be forced to trade “a nondischargeable student loan debt for a non-dischargeable tax debt.”437
Debtors with multiple loans can choose on which loans to seek
discharge; however, loans must be discharged in chronological order, from
newest to oldest. The latter restriction is an intuitive response to the ordinal
manner in which degrees are earned, and means that in all but the rarest
cases, debtors with graduate or professional school loans will have to
successfully discharge those loans prior to being able to discharge
bachelor’s degree (or lower) loans.
For purposes of determining discharge eligibility, a debtor’s
payments on all student loans will be considered, even if the debtor is not
seeking discharge on all loans. The purpose of this approach is to give the
court complete insight into the debtor’s financial picture.
5. Reestablishing Loan Eligibility
Debtors could reestablish eligibility for federal student loans by
satisfying the Federal Student Aid (FSA) process for restoring loan
eligibility—essentially reaffirming their discharged student loan debt. FSA
435

Denittis v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Denittis), 362 B.R. 57, 64 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2007) (“To hold that debtors must participate in [an income-based repayment plan], if
eligible, would be no more than the Court abdicating its responsibility to determine the
dischargeability of a student loan. If this is the outcome Congress intended, it would have
said so”.).
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MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 26.
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Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 803 (Bankr. 1st
Cir. 2010).
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provides four options for restoring loan eligibility to debtors who have
defaulted: 1) pay the loans in full; 2) make six payments of an agreed
amount over a six month period; 3) consolidate loans through a federallyapproved program; or 4) rehabilitate the loans.438 Debtors would be limited
to one reaffirmation. A subsequent bankruptcy discharge would render the
debtor permanently ineligible to receive federal student loans.
6. Scope
The proposed framework would apply to federal loans only. Student
loans secured in the private market would fall outside the framework’s
purview. The author believes that private loans should be dischargeable to
the same extent as other unsecured debt.439 This view is influenced by the
fact that eligibility for a private educational loan is based on a borrower’s
creditworthiness, not an “enlightened” policy of broadening educational
access. As such, private lenders are able to minimize their exposure to
credit risks. Thus, these loans should not be given the same special
treatment afforded federal loans, the vast majority for which
creditworthiness is not considered.
B. Issues Affecting Framework Implementation
Implementation of the proposed framework would be affected
mainly by issues related to costs and politics.
1. Costs
A potential criticism of the framework is that it would increase the
cost of bankruptcy, thus, disadvantaging the debtors it seeks to help. In the
aftermath of the 2005 Act, filing bankruptcy became more expensive both

438

U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID, GOING BACK TO SCHOOL, available at
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DCS/going.back.to.school.html. See also, U.S. DEP’T
OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID, LOAN REHABILITATION,
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DCS/rehabilitation.html (describing loan rehabilitation
as making “at least nine [9] full payments of an agreed amount within twenty [20] days of
their monthly due dates over a ten [10] month period”).
439
Prior to 1984, student loans obtained from an entity other than a “non-profit institution
of higher education” were treated the same in bankruptcy as other unsecured debt.
However, Congress eventually granted private student loans equivalent status to federal
student loans in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Student Loan Bankruptcy Exception, FINAID,
available at http://www.finaid.org/questions/bankruptcyexception.phtml.

62

UNDO UNDUE HARDSHIP

[DATE]

in terms of filing fees and the cost of legal representation.440 Filing fee
increases were statutory in nature.441 Increases in attorney’s fees, while not
technically statutory, were nonetheless the result of the Act’s heightened
reporting and disclosure obligations. These obligations, including those
related to the means test, “increased the average amount of time an attorney
spent on each case”, and thus resulted in higher fees.442
Proving eligibility for discharge under this framework would of
course require an attorney’s time. But whether that time commitment
would be greater than what is already dedicated to determining undue
hardship is unknown. One of the benefits of the framework is heightened
simplicity and efficiency. Thus, it seems entirely possible that the
framework could lead to less time expended by attorneys determining their
client’s eligibility for discharge. If so, lower attorney’s fees could result.
2. Political Environment
As discussed earlier, the implications of student loan indebtedness
have taken on heightened prominence as debt levels have increased
drastically. Proposed solutions to student loan overindebtedness are varied,
ranging from an expansion of income-based repayment options,443 to a call
for forgiveness of all student loan debt,444 to a counterproductive
encouragement of voluntary defaults by student loan debtors.445 There are
even some who believe the federal government should get out of the student
loan business altogether.446 Passions run high on all sides. Thus, proposed
440

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-697, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: DOLLAR
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, 4 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08697.pdf (concluding that attorney’s fees rose an average
of 51% in Chapter 7 cases and 55% in Chapter 13 cases, while filing fees rose 43% in
Chapter 7 cases and 41% in Chapter 13 cases).
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reforms often elicit fierce support and even fiercer criticism.
Given that the solvency of the student loan system has been an
enduring, though exaggerated, justification for restricting discharge of
student loan debt, the proposed framework was developed paying particular
attention to ensuring that only debtors who are legitimately facing crushing
debt and few prospects for repaying it would be incentivized to seek
discharge. The framework acknowledges that many student loan debtors
would benefit from bankruptcy relief, but also appreciates that a limitless
expansion of such relief would be both inadvisable and politically
untenable.

CONCLUSION
With the cost of higher education and reliance on student loans both
rising, an increasing number of debtors will become overburdened with
student loan debt. This trend will be exacerbated by dismal educational
outcomes, stubbornly high unemployment, and stagnant wages. As such an
increasing number of student loan debtors will seek out bankruptcy relief.
The proposed framework was developed to effectively address this
trend by rendering the bankruptcy system fairer to federal student loan
debtors and their creditors—essentially, the taxpayers. The current system
of determining undue hardship is rife with ambiguity and subjectivity;
therefore, it should be undone, replaced by a framework that relies on
objective measures and lends itself to impartiality, economy, uniformity,
and simplicity.

available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/27/should-college-grads-geta-break-on-their-loans/subsidizing-the-college-bubble.

